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WORK on the effects of mergers and acquisitions conducted in bank-ruptcy on bankruptcy law and policy limits its ambition to the bank-
ruptcy goals of maximizing estate value and protecting the rights of
stakeholders, remaining naive as to the larger question of the role of bank-
ruptcy in the broader economic regulatory framework for depressed in-
dustries.1  Existing scholarship reflects a debate pitting theoretical
arguments2 against empirical studies3 on the question of whether bank-
ruptcy mergers and acquisitions, in particular those conducted as fire sales
outside of the plan-confirmation process, adequately protect the rights of
all the bankruptcy estate’s constituents.4
* Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
Thanks to Mark Anderson, Dan Cole, Susan deMaine, Roy Englert, Park Erkmann,
Bert Foer, Nicholas Georgakopoulos, Ken Heyer, Dennis Johnson, Rob Katz, Lynn
LoPucki, Danny Sokol, Bill Stallings, Michael Van Alstine, Spencer Waller, George
Wright, and Josh Wright, as well as participants in colloquia at the University of
Maryland, the University of Toledo, Case Western University, and Indiana
University–McKinney, for conversations on this topic or comments on drafts.  John
Holley and Sam Kerkhoff, IU–McKinney Class of 2013, provided excellent
research assistance.
1. A few examples exist of articles discussing conflicts between bankruptcy
and other regulatory schemes. See, e.g., Josef S. Athanas & Peter P. Knight, Resolv-
ing Conflicts Between the Bankruptcy Code and Other Federal and State Laws, 11 J. BANKR.
L. & PRAC. 237, 238–47 (2002) (examining preemption doctrines involving envi-
ronmental law, labor law, criminal law, and state foreclosure law).
2. E.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55
STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002).
3. E.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH.
L. REV. 1 (2007).
4. See Anne M. Anderson & Yung-Yu Ma, Acquisitions in Bankruptcy: 363 Sales
Versus Plan Sales and the Existence of Fire Sales, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1 (2014)
(describing debate); Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating
the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014) (same).
(839)
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This Article is the first to fully examine the procedural and substan-
tive conflicts between bankruptcy and antitrust in the context of bank-
ruptcy fire sales.  Those conflicts arise because bankruptcy and antitrust
have opposing goals.5  Neither scholars nor courts have resolved the con-
flict between bankruptcy and antitrust despite the increasing frequency of
potentially anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions6 in bankruptcy.  The
rule from Butner v. United States—the Butner principle7—speaks to uni-
formity of results in and out of bankruptcy for constituents of the bank-
ruptcy estate, but no analogous doctrine addresses the need for uniform
treatment of non-bankruptcy policies that arise in the context of a busi-
ness bankruptcy proceeding.  I address that gap for non-constituents with
antitrust concerns flowing from a reorganization.
Antitrust merger review and bankruptcy represent two different ap-
proaches to the same goal of optimizing the structure of an industry.  Anti-
trust allows business combinations in which efficiencies from scale or
synergy outweigh losses due to concentration, including through more
complex remedies than the merely binary stop (injunction) or go (no in-
junction).  Bankruptcy reorganization prevents losses in an industry by
avoiding the idling of assets that have a going-concern premium.  Antitrust
law’s “failing-firm” defense, allowing mergers that might otherwise be
blocked in order to prevent the wasting of assets, is “bankruptcy-lite.”  The
Bankruptcy Code excepts from the automatic stay actions “to enforce such
governmental unit’s . . . police and regulatory power . . . .”8  Bankruptcy
5. James M. Spears, Federal Merger Enforcement in Bankruptcy, 6 ANTITRUST MAG.,
Spring 1992, at 19.
[E]ach regime is designed to accomplish very different objectives.  Pre-
merger review under Section 7A is designed to provide the Commission
and the Department of Justice with an opportunity to identify, analyze
and, where necessary, take steps to halt anticompetitive transactions prior
to consummation.  Proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code, whether
arising as part of a general plan of liquidation under Chapter 7 or as part
of Chapter 11 reorganization, are designed to benefit creditors or the
reorganizing corporation by maximizing the return on any assets sold.
The potential for friction between these two regimes arises because pro-
spective purchasers are willing to pay a premium for assets that confer
market power.
Id.
6. Bankruptcy and antitrust employ different terms as a matter of both tradi-
tion and statute: “asset sales,” “mergers,” “acquisitions,” “sales of property of the
estate,” “combinations,” and others.  I combine all such terms under the phrases
“mergers and acquisitions” and—as a subset of that concept, “bankruptcy fire
sales”—throughout this Article.
7. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are
created and defined by state law. . . .  [T]here is no reason why such interests
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding.”), superseded in part by statute, Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103–394, 108 Stat. 4106. See generally G. Marcus Cole & Todd J.
Zywicki, Anna Nicole Smith Goes Shopping: The New Forum-Shopping Problem in Bank-
ruptcy, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 511, 512–14, 521 (discussing Butner).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2012).
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courts are constrained by laws and regulations that apply outside of bank-
ruptcy, including anti-merger laws, and are charged with interpreting and
applying those laws.
Three core distinctions divide bankruptcy and antitrust in the context
of mergers and acquisitions.  First, bankruptcy is backward-looking and
deals with upstream investor constituents who may be owners or creditors
of the firm.  Antitrust is forward-looking.  It deals with downstream con-
sumer constituents who are not present at the time challenged conduct
occurs and lack a voice in that conduct.9  When a merger or acquisition
takes place in bankruptcy, those constituencies conflict.  Bankruptcy pro-
tects investors by maximizing the payout from the assets10 while antitrust,
if applied, protects consumers by preserving marketplace competition.
Second, bankruptcy goals are served by a merger or acquisition that
benefits the investors in the bankrupt firm by maximizing the estate value.
Maximal value is likely to occur where the merger or acquisition creates
market power for the acquiring firm that can be leveraged to the detri-
ment of consumers.  Antitrust law disfavors mergers or acquisitions pro-
ducing market power unless there are countervailing efficiencies that
outweigh the harms.11  The benefits bankruptcy seeks, in terms of maxi-
mum value to the investors in the firm, are likely to be realized in the
circumstances in which antitrust harms from increased market power are
greatest.
Third, as the term fire sales suggests, mergers and acquisitions in bank-
ruptcy proceed at a much accelerated pace.  Observers frequently speak of
the “need for speed” or of concerns for a “melting ice cube.”12  Where
antitrust review is protected in bankruptcy, the enforcement agencies are
given a shorter period to analyze the transaction and to take steps to op-
pose it before the parties close.13  That same speed is anathema to mean-
ingful antitrust review.  Antitrust review of mergers and acquisitions is a
fact- and economic-analysis-intensive process, frequently requiring review
of millions of documents, retention of expert economic and industry con-
sultants, and preparation of lengthy expert reports.  Parties seeking to ac-
complish complex mergers and acquisitions grant the enforcement
agencies extensions of time beyond the statutory review periods as a mat-
9. Most modern understandings of antitrust treat consumer welfare as the
law’s overarching goal. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF (rev. ed. 1993).  Because consumer transactions are in relevant
regard instantaneous, a consumer’s relationship with a firm either precedes or
postdates conduct.  It does not span the conduct.
10. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
(1986).
11. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDE-
LINES (2010) [hereinafter 2010 GUIDELINES], http://www.justice.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/V56Y-
VQRR].
12. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 4.
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (b)(2)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 18a(f) (2012).
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ter of course.14  Meaningful antitrust review is not possible on the shorter
calendar available in bankruptcy.  These three effects combine to produce
a likelihood of under-enforcement of antitrust laws relative to the opti-
mum, with the danger that economic decline in an industry will produce
an inefficient industry structure leading to broader economic harms.
The conflict I identify here is serious and enduring.  It raises ques-
tions of the relative competencies of (1) the bankruptcy courts applying
the Bankruptcy Code and (2) the federal antitrust enforcement agencies
enforcing the anti-merger laws to produce an efficient allocation of a fail-
ing business’s assets.  In this Article, I propose approaches to reconcile this
conflict that are workable within the parameters of the existing bank-
ruptcy scheme.  Because bankruptcy proceedings undermine full antitrust
review of business combinations, the approach recommended here will
correct the imbalance.  The freedom to conduct bankruptcy asset sales will
be somewhat lessened while the countervailing opportunity to ensure the
maintenance of competitive markets will be enhanced.
Part II gives the background of the existing substantive law and proce-
dural mechanisms for analyzing business combinations under the antitrust
and bankruptcy laws and procedures.  Part II analyzes antitrust merger
control under Clayton Act Section 7, the leading anti-merger provision in
the federal antitrust laws, including premerger notification and the failing-
firm defense to a merger challenge.  This Part also describes the parallel
world of business combinations under the Bankruptcy Code.  Finally,
Part II discusses Bankruptcy Code Section 363(b), which provides for the
sale of assets “other than in the ordinary course of business,”15 as well as
mergers conducted as part of the plan of reorganization under Code Sec-
tion 1123.16
Part III identifies the fundamental conflict between the goals of bank-
ruptcy law and procedure on one hand and those of antitrust merger re-
view on the other.  That conflict’s existence suggests business
combinations under Section 363(b) should produce greater value for the
bankruptcy estate than do those conducted as plan sales.  This Part contin-
ues to discuss empirical work that demonstrates the contrary reality that
values realized in 363(b) sales lag those realized in plan sales.  I offer a
theoretical explanation for this surprising result and show that the harm
from systemic over-reliance on 363(b) sales is greater than either a pure
bankruptcy analysis or a pure antitrust analysis might suggest.
In Parts IV and V, I discuss the optimal reconciliation of this conflict
and offer solutions.  Part IV shows that where a conflict arises between
diffuse constituents of the bankruptcy estate and diffuse consumer inter-
14. ABA, THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO U.S. AND
FOREIGN MERGER REVIEW (Ilene K. Gotts, ed., 3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter MERGER
REVIEW PROCESS].
15. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5).
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ests, consumers—who lack the ability to bargain ex ante—should prevail.
From that demonstration, I conclude that ties should break in favor of
merger enforcement policy rather than the policies of bankruptcy reor-
ganization.  Part V discusses several practical possibilities to bring about
this result, relying primarily on hypothetical amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Code, but also suggests opportunities for change in the Code’s in-
terpretation brought about through the common-law process.
II. ANTITRUST REVIEW OF BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND BANKRUPTCY
TREATMENT OF ANTITRUST CONCERNS
A. Antitrust Merger Control Under Clayton Act Section 7
The federal antitrust laws prohibit a business combination “the effect
of such acquisition [which] may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly.”17  This anti-merger prohibition operates to
preserve marketplace competition by blocking mergers that threaten un-
due concentration.  Merger enforcement is placed in the hands of both
federal and state government antitrust enforcers as well as private plain-
tiffs.  For transactions above a certain size, premerger notice is required to
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,
which enables the FTC or the Department of Justice to investigate and
sometimes to seek injunctive relief before the merger is consummated.18
Private plaintiff enforcement is less common in merger litigation than
it is in other areas of antitrust enforcement, although private rights of ac-
tion do exist and private plaintiffs do become involved in merger chal-
lenges.19  The purpose of private plaintiff enforcement in the scheme is a
subject of some debate among commentators.  The best explanation holds
that private plaintiffs serve as a backstop when federal enforcement fails to
sufficiently prevent or remedy anticompetitive business combinations.20
The Clayton Act condemns purchases of assets or equity shares, “the
effect of [which] [ ] may . . . tend to create a monopoly.”21  The statute
regulates corporate mergers as well as acquisitions.  A business combina-
17. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.  Since 1950, the prohibition has applied to
both stock purchases and asset purchases.
18. Id. at § 18a.
19. For one recent example, Sprint pursued litigation parallel to the Depart-
ment of Justice’s successful effort to block the merger between AT&T and T-
Mobile.
20. A recent example of private-plaintiff enforcement is the temporary re-
straining order sought in the fall of 2013 by a consumer class challenging the
American Airlines and U.S. Airways merger brought in bankruptcy court after the
settlement between the Justice Department and the merging airlines.  Supporting
the backstop theory of private enforcement, lead counsel Joseph Alioto reportedly
criticized the Department of Justice for the settlement agreement. See Nicholas
Sakelaris, American, US Airways Meet on Private Antitrust Suit, DALLAS BUS. J. (Nov.
20, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/news/2013/11/20/american-us-air-
ways-meet-wednesday.html [http://perma.cc/PAB2-QTVY].
21. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
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tion will implicate the prohibition if, by increasing concentration, it cre-
ates opportunity and incentive for the merged firm to raise prices
unilaterally or in coordination with its competitors.22  Modern interpreta-
tions of the Clayton Act recognize that harms from concentration can be
mitigated if the merger increases efficiency through scale economies or
productive synergies.23
B. The Failing-Firm Defense
Federal antitrust policy recognizes problems of industrial decline and
poor management leading to consolidation and changes of ownership.24
The failing firm defense, recognized as a matter of case law, legislative
history, and enforcement guidelines, operates as a sort of “bankruptcy-lite”
to allow mergers to proceed where the alternative is the dissipation of pro-
ductive assets.25  The failing-firm defense to a merger challenge has been
22. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 2.
23. Id. at 25; FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v.
Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997). Federal anti-merger regulation is
mature.  Since 1968, the Department of Justice and FTC have collaborated on
guidelines for horizontal merger enforcement that describe the agencies’ in-
tended exercise of their prosecutorial discretion in merger enforcement. See 2010
GUIDELINES, supra note 11.  First promulgated in 1968 and reissued most recently
in 2010, the modern Horizontal Merger Guidelines reflect many decades of refine-
ment in economic and legal thought.
The 2010 version was drafted over two years with input by policy-makers, aca-
demics, and members of the regulated communities.  The 2010 Guidelines are
broadly recognized as an authoritative statement of the law governing mergers be-
tween horizontal competitors. See generally Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionaliza-
tion: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771,
776 (2006) (“The influence of this guideline system emerges from a process of
institutionalization through which the guidelines become valued for more than
the persuasive power of their ideas.  This institutionalization process arguably has
had an undue influence on the common law as courts have failed to fully engage
the legal and economic substance of the guidelines.”).
24. See generally Ashley J. Austin, Comment, Food for Thought: The Efficiencies
Achieved by Trimming an Industry at Overcapacity Through Mergers vs. Chapter 11 Reorga-
nizations, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 147, 152–72 (2008) (discussing origin and devel-
opment of failing-firm defense).
25. Commentators disagree regarding whether the failing-firm defense is eco-
nomically efficient.  A critic might argue that the result of approving an otherwise
illegal merger always or nearly always leads to an inefficient outcome.  According
to this argument, the efficient outcome is the result obtained under antitrust re-
view in the absence of the defense, and any other result must be less efficient.  A
proponent of the defense might argue that its application often leads to an effi-
cient outcome, or is at least not inefficient.
Professor Campbell makes a case for the defense’s efficiency by observing that
a failing company has two choices: to exit the market or to sell out to another firm
in its present market.  Thomas J. Campbell, The Efficiency of the Failing Company
Defense, 63 TEX. L. REV. 251, 257 (1984).  Campbell notes that critics of the defense
have not considered the other side of the balance—the consequences of
letting a firm simply leave the industry.  When a failing firm departs from
the market, the resources it had employed are devoted to their next best
use, which could be either scrap or the manufacture of a completely dif-
ferent product.  This causes an economic loss because the resources have
6
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recognized in federal case law since at least 1930.26  Congress declined to
disturb it when amending the anti-merger statute, Clayton Act Section 7,
in 1950.  The Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission have me-
morialized it in every version of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines since
their inception in 1968.  And academic commentators nearly universally
recognize the defense’s validity.
The failing-firm defense is the antitrust law’s scheme for corporate
reorganization.27  It permits a business combination leading to otherwise
less value both to consumers and to the firm in their new use than they
had in their former use.
Id. (footnote omitted).
The flaw in Campbell’s argument is easily shown by recognizing that the de-
fense operates as a one-way ratchet.  The defense can permit business combina-
tions to go forward that would otherwise be blocked, but it cannot provide a basis
to block combinations that otherwise would be allowed.  (In other words, the lack
of a failing firm is not in itself a reason to block a business combination).  The
defense can only be neutral or under-enforcing on net.
26. One source dates the defense earlier than 1930. See Richard D. Friedman,
Untangling the Failing Company Doctrine, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 1376 n.1 (1986).  In
International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930), the Court stated a two-part test
for a successful failing-firm defense.  First, the acquired firm must be facing the
grave probability of a business failure.  Second, the acquired firm must have had
no other prospective purchasers.
27. In Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, involving a merger of newspaper
competitors, the Supreme Court added a third element to the defense: the firm
asserting this defense must also be unable to reorganize successfully in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding.  394 U.S. 131 (1969). Citizen Publishing is the first explicit rec-
ognition that the failing-firm defense serves as an alternative to the bankruptcy
reorganization procedure for preserving the value in a declining industry.
Campbell’s argument must therefore rest on a proposition that the optimal
level of merger review necessarily is less in a business combination transaction in-
volving a failing firm.  That proposition depends on either (1) a failing firm’s
unique inability to bear enforcement costs or (2) an understanding that preserving
a failing firm in the market is an efficient outcome in all cases, rendering any
enforcement costs (including the possibility of false-positive results) wasteful.  Ei-
ther argument, if true, might support a conclusion of a lesser optimal level of
antitrust enforcement.
Both arguments are wrong if applied uniquely to business combinations in-
volving firms meeting some form of a failing-firm defense rather than generally
across all business combinations.  The first argument—a failing firm’s unique in-
ability to bear enforcement costs—ignores that the cost of merger review repre-
sents a tax on business combination transactions and relief from that cost
represents a tax subsidy.  The defense therefore provides a subsidy favoring busi-
ness combinations involving weak firms.  At the margins it provides an incentive to
permit failure to occur that otherwise might be avoided.
The second efficiency argument holds that preserving a failing firm in the
market is efficient in all cases.  Under that argument, we should not tolerate anti-
trust enforcement costs beyond the minimum necessary to establish the applica-
tion of the defense.  This argument proves too much.  The assumption that scrap
or extra market use is less valuable than preserving the assets in the original mar-
ket ignores that the firm’s failure may be because the original use was less valued
than alternatives.  There are few assets with such single-purpose use that their exit
necessarily equates to welfare loss.  The frequent example of railroad tracks as the
archetype of a single purpose asset is even misguided; track beds have been repur-
posed as valuable public resources. See, e.g., Western Maryland Rail Trail, HANCOCK
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intolerable market consolidation where there is reason to believe there is
no other way to preserve the assets in the marketplace.28  The failing-firm
defense is most frequently justified by a belief that if the failing firm was
exiting the market, consolidation was occurring with or without the busi-
ness combination.  Therefore, the business combination will not harm
competition.29
This syllogism supporting the defense suffers both from faulty logic
and a questionable premise.  A buyer who purchases assets and market
share at a discount is advantaged vis-a`-vis its competitors, which may lead
to an anticompetitive increase in market dominance.30  The faulty pre-
mise becomes clear when one appreciates that whether a firm is failing,
merely “flailing,” or even substantially healthy, is a question of real uncer-
tainty.31  The defense is therefore narrow: according to Section 11 of the
2010 Guidelines, any offer to purchase the assets for a price above the
liquidation value is a “reasonable” offer that will undermine the defense.32
As a former FTC official said in support of the then-existing version of the
failing-firm defense: “These requirements are strict.  They are rarely all
satisfied, and as a result, the defense is seldom successfully invoked.”33
MD. CHAMBER COMM., http://www.westernmarylandrailtrail.org/WMRT/ [http://
perma.cc/DK8Y-SAF7] (last visited Nov. 19, 2015).
If preserving failing firms is efficient in all cases, no industry would be permit-
ted to collapse—even if an industry, such as the manufacture of buggy-whips, has
no meaningful place in a changing economy (Professor Jackson’s example). See
JACKSON, supra note 10.  Moreover, there is no logical inflection point at which
blocking a business combination becomes inappropriate.  If preserving a failing
firm is per se efficient, preventing a firm from reaching the point of imminent
failure can be justified and preventing a firm from even beginning its decline
might also be justified.  Under that logical extension of the failing firm argument,
all merger review is wasteful.  Few commentators have taken such an extreme posi-
tion. But see Fred S. McChesney, Defending the Failing-Firm Defense, 65 NEB. L. REV. 1,
5–12 (1986).
28. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 11, pt. 11, at 32 (elements of defense
operate to require imminent exit).
29. Id.
30. Without the asset sale, the market share of the exiting firm would be
shared among the remaining firms, presumably being absorbed by the remaining
firm with the greatest amount of idle productive capacity.  The 2010 Guidelines
seek to control for that concern by requiring that the assets are shopped to pur-
chasers that present less concerns for an anticompetitive business combination. Id.
pt. 11, at 32 & n.16.
31. David Scheffman, Malcolm Coate & Louis Silvia, 20 Years of Merger Guide-
lines Enforcement at the FTC: An Economic Perspective 50 (2002), http://www.justice
.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/12881.pdf [http://perma.cc/
3MD6-4WWN] (“While th[e] concept of a failing firm is relatively straightforward,
assessing whether or not a firm truly is failing can be quite challenging.”).
32. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 11, pt. 11, at 32.
33. Debra A. Valentine, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm’n Office of Policy
Planning, Speech: Horizontal Issues: What’s Happening and What’s on the Hori-
zon (Dec. 8, 1995), transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/
1995/12/horizontal-issues-whats-happening-and-whats-horizon [https://perma
.cc/LJ4Y-RTKZ] (discussing Section 5.1 of 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines).
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The original justification for the failing-firm defense does not relate
to the economic efficiency of allowing the failing firm to merge despite
competitive concerns.34  One year after the 1929 stock market crash, the
Supreme Court took the view in International Shoe v. FTC that protecting
the community in which a failing firm did business was a controlling ratio-
nale for a defense to a merger challenge:
In the light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation with
resources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so re-
mote that it faced the grave probability of a business failure with
resulting loss to its stockholders and injury to the communities
where its plants were operated, we hold that the purchase of its
capital stock by a competitor (there being no other prospective
purchaser), not with a purpose to lessen competition, but to facil-
itate the accumulated business of the purchaser and with the ef-
fect of mitigating seriously injurious consequences otherwise
probable, is not in contemplation of law prejudicial to the public
and does not substantially lessen competition or restrain com-
merce within the intent of the Clayton Act.35
Decided nearly forty years later in 1969, the Court’s statement of the
defense in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States has become the controlling
judicial formulation.36 Citizen Publishing involved an effort to merge the
34. Not all commentators agree.  For contrary views, see infra notes 58–68 and
accompanying text.
35. Int’l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302–03 (1930).  The result in Interna-
tional Shoe is consistent with other Depression-era antitrust precedents and legisla-
tion.  For example, the Court’s decision in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
written in the same year, allowed firms to cartelize to protect employees and com-
munities that would have suffered if the firms had been permitted to fail.  288 U.S.
344 (1933), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752 (1984). International Shoe and Appalachian Coals preceded the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act, which also subordinated antitrust law to economic recovery
goals. See generally SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 83–84
(2005) (describing antitrust enforcement during National Recovery Administra-
tion).  Language from International Shoe has been misinterpreted to support an
efficiency justification for the Court’s holding. See Campbell, supra note 25, at 4
(“to facilitate the accumulated business of the purchaser” (quoting Int’l Shoe, 280
U.S. at 302–03)).  That interpretation is misguided as an historical matter—eco-
nomic efficiency rationales as they have been understood since the 1970s were not
part of Supreme Court antitrust precedents in 1930—and as an interpretive mat-
ter.  The relevant passage from International Shoe starts with the goal of avoiding
“loss to [ ] stockholders and injury to the communities” and continues to observe
the salutary benefits of “mitigating seriously injurious consequences otherwise
probable” (if the merger is not allowed). See 280 U.S. at 302–03.
36. Courts have occasionally appeared to deviate from the Citizen Publishing
rule.  Five years later the Supreme Court appeared to return to the two-element
International Shoe framework in a merger involving coal-mining companies.  The
actual importance of that development in United States v. General Dynamics, Corp. is
debatable. See 415 U.S. 486 (1974).  The General Dynamics Court referenced the
defense in passing, holding on other grounds that the merger did not violate the
Clayton Act.  Other courts that have ostensibly failed to follow the additional third
9
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operations of competing newspapers.37  On appeal, the Supreme Court
had no difficulty concluding the joint operation agreement violated the
Clayton Act, but considered the argument that Citizen Publishing was a
failing company.  The district court had found as a factual matter that
“Citizen Publishing was not then on the verge of going out of business, nor
was there a serious probability at that time that Citizen Publishing would
terminate its business and liquidate its assets unless Star Publishing and
Citizen Publishing entered into the operating agreement.”38  Recognizing
the success of the bankruptcy reorganization scheme under the then-ex-
isting Bankruptcy Act, the Court added the “inability to reorganize in
bankruptcy” element to the International Shoe rule:
[W]e know from the broad experience of the business commu-
nity since 1930, the year when the International Shoe case was de-
cided, that companies reorganized through receivership, or
through Chapter X or Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act often
emerged as strong competitive companies.  The prospects of re-
organization of the Citizen in 1940 would have had to be dim or
nonexistent to make the failing company doctrine applicable to
this case.39
Since Citizen Publishing, courts generally have included the require-
ment of an inability to reorganize in bankruptcy in their statements of the
defense.40  The Court in Citizen Publishing did not give a reason for adding
this third element.  The opinion is susceptible to a reading that the Court
was generically hostile to the defense and sought to cabin it.41  Building
on that understanding, the best justification for limiting the failing-firm
element from Citizen Publishing appear to have concluded the element was inappli-
cable on the particular facts rather than relying on a holding that the element
should not be applied.
37. Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 133 (1969).
38. Id. at 137 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court affirmed that
factual conclusion: “There is no indication that the owners of the Citizen were
contemplating a liquidation.  They never sought to sell the Citizen and there is no
evidence that the joint operating agreement was the last straw at which the Citizen
grasped.  Indeed the Citizen continued to be a significant threat to the Star.” Id.
39. Id. at 138.  The Court also noted that the burden of proving the defense
was on the party asserting it and that Citizen Publishing had failed to meet its
burden. Id. at 138–39.
40. Judge Posner has argued that the inability to reorganize in bankruptcy
element was inappropriately grafted into the defense because the purpose of the
defense is to keep firms from entering bankruptcy. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW (2d ed. 2001).  Posner’s view recognizes the alternative nature of reorganiza-
tion by merger and reorganization through Chapter 11. See also, e.g., Austin, supra
note 24, at 165–74.  Requiring an inability to reorganize as an element of the de-
fense might thrust firms into Chapter 11 first and allow the failing-firm defense
only where that reorganization has proved unsuccessful.
41. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing, 394 U.S. at 139 (“We confine the failing com-
pany doctrine to its present narrow scope.”).  This read of the rationale behind
Citizen Publishing is supported by the view that the Warren Court was particularly
hostile to merger activity in the 1960s. See United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384
10
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defense where bankruptcy reorganization is possible is that bankruptcy re-
organizations are preferred to business combinations as a means to rescue
a firm faced with operating challenges.42 Citizen Publishing is best read as
repudiating Depression-era precedents that favored industrial survival
over consumer interests.43
More recent decisions follow the Citizen Publishing rule.44  The Sixth
Circuit reviewed a vertical merger in the cement industry in United States
Steel Corp. v. FTC,45 holding that the defense was not met on the basis of
the merging parties’ failure to prove an inability to reorganize in bank-
ruptcy. In California v. Sutter Health,46 the Ninth Circuit discussed the in-
ability-to-reorganize element in depth, finding testimony by a financial
expert that bankruptcy proceedings would likely result in liquidation con-
vincing.  The Citizen Publishing rule also controlled the development of the
defense in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.47
1. The Defense in the Guidelines
By the time of the 1992 Guidelines, the statement of the failing-firm
defense had expanded to include four elements.  A firm was required to
show (1) it would be unable to meet its financial obligations in the near
future; (2) it would not be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter
U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The sole consistency that I can find
is that in litigation under [Section] 7, the Government always wins.”).
42. This prioritizing would respect the empirical result reached by LoPucki
that full reorganizations tend to produce greater long-term value than do business
combinations that are not subjected to full stake-holder involvement and court
review. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG
CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 167–80 (2005); LoPucki & Doherty,
supra note 3, at 1.
43. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933),
overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984);
Int’l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).  This view is not a necessary interpreta-
tion: if, based on an appreciation of the empirical reality that LoPucki and others
have demonstrated, Citizen Publishing preferred a full bankruptcy reorganization to
a sale in order to return greater value to stake-holders, it may suggest a willingness
to subordinate consumer interests.  However, the facts before the Court did not
involve a distinction between a hasty sale and a reorganization, but rather between
a joint management and profit-sharing agreement and a reorganization.  If any-
thing, the choice the Court preferred (reorganization) subordinated stake-holder
interests to those of consumers.
44. Thomas D. Fina & Vishal Mehta, The Failing Firm Defense: Alive and Well,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2011, at 1, available at http://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/aug11_fina_7_26f.authcheckdam.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q8ZV-ZSUG] (“Since its debut in 1930, the failing firm defense
has remained remarkably consistent in its formulation.”).
45. 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970).
46. 217 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
47. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 11.  The first version of the Guidelines,
published in 1968, provided for a failing-firm defense that was modeled on the
two-element International Shoe test.  Every Guidelines’ revision, including the cur-
rent 2010 version, has included a version of the failing-firm defense.
11
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11 of the Bankruptcy Code; (3) it had made unsuccessful good-faith ef-
forts to elicit reasonable alternative offers that would keep its tangible and
intangible assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe danger to
competition than would the proposed merger; and (4) in the absence of
the acquisition, its assets would soon exit the relevant market.48
Under the Guidelines re-written and promulgated by the Department
of Justice and FTC in 2010:
[A]ll of the following circumstances [must be] met: (1) the alleg-
edly failing firm would be unable to meet its financial obligations
in the near future; (2) it would not be able to reorganize success-
fully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act; and (3) it has
made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alterna-
tive offers that would keep its tangible and intangible assets in
the relevant market and pose a less severe danger to competition
than does the proposed merger.49
The 2010 Guidelines eliminated the fourth “imminent exit” element from
the statement of the defense in 1992.50  It is unlikely that in practice the
elimination of the imminent-exit element in the 2010 Guidelines will have
48. The 1992 Guidelines’ version of the failing-firm defense was, on its face,
less permissive than the prevailing judicial statement of the defense.  The first
Guidelines element alters the first element from International Shoe—“grave
probability of business failure”—in two ways.  It added what could best be called an
imminence requirement and it split the element into two.  Guidelines element one
was an imminent insolvency requirement, and Guidelines element four was an im-
minent exiting assets requirement.  Guidelines element two is borrowed directly
from Citizen Publishing, demonstrating that contrary to some holdings (including
Supreme Court’s General Dynamics decision) the agencies believed the inability to
reorganize in bankruptcy to be a requirement distinct from imminent business
failure.  Guidelines element three continued to approximate the second Interna-
tional Shoe element, requiring the merging parties to establish a lack of reasonable
offers that did not present the same competitive concerns.
49. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 32.
50. The 2010 Guidelines’ elimination of the “imminent exit” element is in-
triguing.  On one hand, that element is the very core of the defense—so much so
that in 2009 Ken Heyer and Sheldon Kimmel proposed in passing that the defense
might better be called the “exiting assets” defense.  They argued that the defense
should fail if the assets would remain in the market in the absence of the merger,
whether under independent ownership or after a less anticompetitive sale to an
alternative buyer.  The rationale for having a failing-firm defense at all depends on
the imminence of exit.  In a case in which that element is not met, a basic merger
efficiencies analysis will accomplish the purpose of weighing the harms from the
merger against its benefits.  At first blush, that change should make the failing firm
defense easier to establish than prior versions of the defense.  A firm threatened
with equity insolvency (defined as the inability to pay debts as they come due), is
not necessarily a firm on the verge of failure and exit, which both International Shoe
and the 1968 Guidelines had required in their first element, and the 1992 Guide-
lines had required in the now-eliminated fourth element. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 303(h)(1) (2012) (listing first element).
12
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a substantial impact on the use of the failing-firm defense as applied by the
enforcement agencies.51
The 2010 Guidelines maintain the long-standing clarification that a
“reasonable alternative offer” for the assets or stock of the failing firm in-
cludes “[a]ny offer to purchase the assets of the failing firm for a price
above the liquidation value of those assets . . . .”52  This definition is a low
bar.  To the agencies’ views, nearly any would-be buyer willing to operate
the assets in the market of concern will defeat the defense.53  The failing-
firm defense under the Guidelines thus operates only to preserve produc-
tive capacity in the market and does not contemplate benefits to constitu-
ents of the firm.  The reasonable-alternative-offer rule establishes the
modern antitrust-law view that consumer interests take priority over inves-
tor interests.  This result contrasts with and improves on the original Inter-
national Shoe rationale for the judicially-created defense.54
The any-price-above-liquidation-value standard is best explained by an
understanding that any increment of value above liquidation value is justi-
fied by an expectation of market power that may create opportunity and
incentive for the post-combination firm to engage in non-competitive out-
put and pricing decisions.  If a claim of merger-specific efficiencies55 over-
comes that concern, the merging parties can rely on an efficiencies
51. It is difficult to imagine a firm that is both facing equity insolvency and
unlikely to be successful in Chapter 11 reorganization that is not also facing immi-
nent exit from the market of concern in the absence of an otherwise anticompeti-
tive merger.  There is a scenario under which the elimination might ease the
defense’s availability.  Courts are not bound by the Guidelines, but may find them
persuasive.  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines do not have the force of law, but
they do express the views of two expert agencies, announced after a notice-and-
comment consideration process, as to the appropriate interpretation and applica-
tion of the antitrust laws’ anti-merger provisions. See generally Greene, supra note
23.  Judicial reliance on the Guidelines can be expected to function as a one-way
ratchet.  Rules that support non-enforcement will be more persuasive (as abdica-
tions of enforcement power) than will be rules that support aggressive enforce-
ment (which reflect the agencies’ enforcement ambitions).
This result follows from the lack of competing guidelines for merging parties
that seek application of the failing-firm defense.  A court might reasonably decline
to apply the second element of the Guidelines’ formulation, relying instead on the
original statement of the defense and the authorities that have hewed to that for-
mulation, and not require the merging parties to demonstrate the Citizen Publish-
ing requirement of an inability to reorganize in Chapter 11.  That same court
might nonetheless be persuaded by the federal enforcement agencies’ announce-
ment in the 2010 Guidelines that the defense could be applied without the immi-
nent-exit element.  Under such a scenario, a firm facing equity insolvency, for
which Chapter 11 is a realistic option, and which might—whether through bank-
ruptcy or otherwise—remain as a competitor in the marketplace for the foresee-
able future, could nonetheless avail itself of the failing-firm defense.
52. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 32 n.16.
53. “Liquidation,” as it is used here, refers to a sale for any use other than
production in the current market of concern.
54. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  This conflicts with bankruptcy
law preferences for investor interests. See infra note 240.
55. Economic benefits that could not be achieved without the merger.
13
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defense.56  Such a business combination would not need the failing-firm
defense.  The efficiencies defense also would operate to permit business
combinations that were valuable because of cost-reducing and output-en-
hancing synergies.57  The liquidation-value standard ensures the failing-
firm defense will only apply if there is no anticompetitive effect at all from
the combination or merger-specific efficiencies overcome the harms from
increased concentration.
2. Rationales for the Defense
Two leading rationales support the failing-firm defense.  First, the
business combination involving a failing firm may have no significant ad-
verse effect on competition or may be efficient relative to the alternative
(the firm’s exit).  Second, the defense can be justified on the basis of so-
cial benefits because it serves the interests of stockholders, creditors, and
employees.58
a. No Competitive Effect
The 2010 Guidelines provide an example of the no-competitive-effect
rationale:
[A] merger is not likely to enhance market power if imminent
failure . . . of one of the merging firms would cause the assets of
that firm to exit the relevant market. . . .  If the relevant assets
would otherwise exit the market, customers are not worse off af-
56. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 11, pt. 10, at 29 (“[A] primary benefit of
mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies and
thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete . . . .”); see also,
e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. Univ. Health,
Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066
(D.D.C. 1997).
57. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 11, pt. 10, at 29–30 (combining comple-
mentary assets, reducing costs, creating new maverick firm).
58. See Henry B. McFarland & Philip B. Nelson, Failing Firms and Declining
Industries, 3 ISSUES COMPETITION L.  & POL’Y 1691 (2008), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1529815 [http://perma.cc/G5MF-F86R].  A naı¨ve commenter may
be ambivalent as between the two rationales.  According to one member of the
U.S. Senate, speaking about American Airlines’ 2001 business combination with
debtor Trans-World Airlines: “American has come to TWA’s rescue, which I sup-
port.  It will save jobs, and protect consumers who would have lost service.”  The
same senator also stated, “[w]ithout American’s efforts, TWA would have been
forced to close its doors, leaving thousands of employees out of work, and more
important, thousands of travelers without service.  The point is that we are not
losing a competitor that would not have been lost anyway.” Effects of the American
Airlines/TWA Transaction and Other Airline Industry Consolidation on Competition and
the Consumer: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 107th Cong. 3
(2001) [hereinafter Effects of American Airlines/TWA Transaction Hearing] (prepared
statement of Sen. Ernest F. Hollings, Member of S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. &
Transp.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg86771/html/
CHRG-107shrg86771.htm [http://perma.cc/MR9W-HP8V].  Both rationales are
reflected in the senator’s statement of support for the business combination.
14
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ter the merger than they would have been had the merger been
enjoined.59
Heyer and Kimmel argue for this rationale in their analysis published dur-
ing the 2010 Guidelines’ drafting.60  Where the assets would otherwise exit
the market, “by definition these assets would be providing no competitive
constraint in the market at all.”61  Retaining the assets in the market pre-
serves present capacity, which gives firms incentives to maintain output
levels.62  In contrast, the decline in capacity that will occur if the firm is
permitted to fail will decrease supply-side elasticity, making non-competi-
tive price and output decisions profitable.63
This rationale is not indubitably correct in all circumstances.  It is pos-
sible to imagine a circumstance in which the assets of the failing firm are
purchased by a dominant competitor.  The dominant acquiring firm may
face incentives (1) to idle the assets64 or (2) to deploy them to deter or to
punish pro-competitive price reductions, output increases, or entry deci-
sions by competitors or would-be competitors.  In such a case, even while
nominally maintaining industry capacity, the business combination would
harm, rather than benefit, competition in the industry.65
59. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 11, pt. 11, at 32.
60. See KEN HEYER & SHELDON KIMMEL, ECON. ANALYSIS GRP., EAG 09-1,
MERGER REVIEW OF FIRMS IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS (2009), available at http://www
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2009/03/31/244098.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/SFP8-URNQ].
61. See id. at 6.
62. Fundamental antitrust economics establishes that maintaining output
levels protects against concentration-caused price increases. See generally ROBERT S.
PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 263–66 (Valerie Ashton ed., 3d
ed. 1994).
63. Some have read the Supreme Court’s opinion in International Shoe to re-
present an efficiency basis for the failing-firm defense.  That Court noted that the
acquiring firm had been forced to cancel orders it did not have the capacity to fill,
such that “the controlling purpose of the International in [seeking to merge] was
to secure additional factories, which it could not itself build with sufficient
speed . . . .”  Int’l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 301 (1930).  The acquirer, Inter-
national Shoe, expected to profit from the merger by increasing output in a way it
could not “but for” the merger.  That output increase, with its attendant decrease
in prices, represents a benefit to consumers from keeping the failing firm’s assets
in operation in the industry in question.
64. For a real-world example, Hercules Offshore, Inc. purchased competitor
Seahawk Drilling, Inc. in 2011 in a transaction later characterized by Hercules’
counsel as presenting a “high combined market share” and likely to lead to “a
second request and a protracted investigation.”  Fina & Mehta, supra note 44, at 4.
According to the Wall Street Journal, after a decline in drilling, Hercules returned to
profitability after selling “many of its older rigs, including some for scrap,” while
“[o]thers had been ‘stacked,’ or idle . . . .”  Alison Sider & Ben Fox Rubin, Hercules
Offshore Swings to Surprise Fourth-Quarter Profit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2013, http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324880504578300233453952480
[http://perma.cc/KP36-7ZNJ].
65. Another example of potential for harm in a business combination involv-
ing a failing firm involves an acquiring firm that seeks to effect a business combina-
tion in spite of a lack of merger-specific efficiencies.  Heyer and Kimmel argue the
15
Huffman: Worlds Colliding: Competition Policy and Bankruptcy Asset Sales
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-5\VLR501.txt unknown Seq: 16 15-DEC-15 10:03
854 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 839
b. Non-Economic Benefits
The most natural reading of International Shoe, particularly if under-
taken with an understanding of contemporary antitrust precedents and
political realities in the years following the 1929 stock market crash, holds
that the defense was created to protect a firm’s constituents other than
consumers, including shareholders, employees, and communities.  Rich-
ard Posner has subscribed to this interpretation.66  Non-economic consid-
erations are of demonstrable interest to Congress when it acts under its
legislative prerogative to evaluate proposed mergers.  For example, con-
gressional hearings held at the time of the 2001 acquisition of Trans-
World Airlines (TWA) by competitor American Airlines included substan-
tial discussion of the effect of TWA’s expected failure on employees and
communities.67
Political realities of executive antitrust enforcement suggest that non-
economic interests enter into enforcement decisions as well.  For example,
the recent US Airways/American Airlines merger was subject to a strong
Justice Department challenge and did not involve a viable failing-firm de-
fense.  Nonetheless, the challenge settled on what many have argued were
benign terms following arguments by state government leaders and indi-
vidual members of Congress that the merger was good for the companies,
their employees, and affected communities.
The social benefits justification underlies other successful mergers as
well.  The sale of Chrysler Corporation to Fiat S.p.A. in 2009 during the
course of the Chrysler bankruptcy proceeding can best be explained as an
effort to preserve an economically important manufacturer during a time
of national economic distress.  Bank mergers were likewise permitted to
proceed during the time of the financial crisis with limited antitrust
review.68
acquirer anticipates dividends from increased prices, which suggests the acquiring
firm knows that (1) the imminent exit story is false and (2) the acquisition will give
it market power that it would not have in the absence of the acquisition.  Heyer
and Kimmel suggest that the acquirer will exercise that market power by shutting
down the acquired firm. See HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 60.  For example, as long-
time airline industry observer Michael Levine testified to Congress in the context
of the American-TWA transaction, “I do not think it is a particularly good deal for
American and its shareholders . . . .  American wants TWA’s assets partly be-
cause . . . network size and scope matter and American would like to grow a little
bit, to move up on United.” Effects American Airlines/TWA Transaction Hearing, supra
note 58, at 36 (statement of Michael Levine, Adjunct Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School).
66. POSNER, supra note 40.  Others disagree.  The federal enforcement agen-
cies have not favored the social benefits rationale for the defense.  The argument
that social costs should be taken into account was made in hearings prior to the
1997 amendments to the Guidelines, but the agencies did not elect to include such
language in the Guidelines.
67. See, e.g., Effects American Airlines/TWA Transaction Hearing, supra note 58, at
5 (statement of Hon. Louise McIntosh Slaughter).
68. As a matter of a federal statute limited to banks, social benefits are held to
outweigh efficiency considerations.  The Bank Merger Act of 1966 permits federal
16
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C. Business Combinations Under the Bankruptcy Code
In the prior two subparts, this Article explained antitrust law’s treat-
ment of mergers and asset sales, showing that antitrust law has developed
in the years since the 1930s to limit the availability of mergers and asset
sales where consumers might be harmed, even if the effect was to permit a
company to exit the market.  This Subpart shows the bankruptcy law treat-
ment of business combinations, both as part of the plan of reorganization
and as out of the ordinary course of business asset sales that are part of the
process of reshuffling the estate in preparation for the reorganization
plan.
The Bankruptcy Code provides two mechanisms for allowing business
combinations under bankruptcy court supervision.69  First is an out of the
ordinary course of business sale of assets authorized by Bankruptcy Code
Section 363(b).70  Second is a plan sale under Bankruptcy Code Section
1123(a).71  Either might be used in any particular case; as the bankruptcy
court noted in In re Gulf States Oil Corp., “[t]he Bankruptcy Code does not
provide any explicit guidance to determine when [Section] 363(b) is the
appropriate procedure and when [Section] 1123 is the appropriate
procedure.”72
First, Chapter 11 provides for bankruptcy business combinations as
part of a plan of reorganization under Bankruptcy Code Section 1123.
The plan “shall” provide adequate means for its implementation, with the
sale of estate property being one of the listed alternatives for accomplish-
ing this requirement; in addition, “a plan may . . . provide for the sale of all
or substantially all of the property of the estate . . . .”73  A plan sale under
Section 1123 protects diffuse stakeholders through detailed procedures
and requirements that must be met for plan approval.  Non-stakeholder
interests are not specifically protected, but concern for the success of the
plan sale ensures relevant regulatory policies become part of the bank-
ruptcy court’s decision process on confirmation.
enforcement agencies to approve even anticompetitive transactions if the federal
agencies find that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transactions are out-
weighed by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the “convenience and
needs” of the community to be served.  12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2), (5)(A) (2012).
Like the failing-firm defense, the burden of proving the social benefit defense is
on the merging banks. See United States v. First City Nat’l Bank, 386 U.S. 361
(1967). See generally Terry Calvani & Cecil Saehoon Chung, Antitrust Analysis of
Bank Mergers: A Survey of Recent Developments, FINDLAW.COM (Mar. 26, 2008), http://
corporate.findlaw.com/finance/antitrust-analysis-of-bank-mergers-a-survey-of-re-
cent.html [http://perma.cc/25HN-C7PT].
69. See In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 414–15 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2009).
70. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 72–73, 93 and accompanying text.
72. 404 B.R. at 415.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (2012).
17
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Second, although pre-Code law was mixed on the subject,74 modern
interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code also allow business combinations
under Section 363(b), which provides for sales of estate property “other
than in the ordinary course of business” with court approval after notice
and a hearing.75  Section 363(b) provides little specific guidance as to its
reach and operation.76  Some courts have been confused as to the differ-
ences between a plan sale and a Section 363(b) sale, although the better
interpretation of the statute is to consider the 363(b) sale to be available
before a plan is approved and the plan sale to be available only with full
plan approval.77
The 363(b) sale procedure offers two substantial benefits from the
perspective of the parties to a business combination transaction.  First, in
the normal course judicial scrutiny and stakeholder involvement is less
than if the sale were conducted as part of the reorganization plan.78  Sec-
ond, opportunities for regulatory interference, including procedures for
antitrust review, are curtailed.79  The flip sides of both coins suggest less
protection for both stakeholders and non-stakeholders, depending on reg-
74. In Fidelity Assurance Ass’n v. Sims, the Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts’ decisions declining to dismiss a reorganization petition for bad faith under
the then-in-force Bankruptcy Act.  318 U.S. 608, 618–19 (1943).  The Court noted
it was clear from the petition that reorganization could not succeed and that “Con-
gress did not intend resort to Chapter X [the predecessor to the Bankruptcy
Code’s Chapter 11] to be had for the mere purpose of liquidation.” Id. at 621.
Consistent with the Court’s approach, the Third Circuit limited pre-plan asset sales
to “emergencies where there is imminent danger that the assets of the ailing busi-
ness will be lost if prompt action is not taken.” In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 176 F.2d 493,
494 (3d Cir. 1949) (providing examples of sufficient emergency such as “a ware-
house full of meat in storage” and lack of “money to buy ice”).  Other circuits
interpreted Sims narrowly, permitting pre-plan business combinations to take place
in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Int’l Bank of Miami v. Brock (In re Dania Corp.), 400 F.2d
833, 836 (4th Cir. 1968); Patent Cereals v. Flynn, 149 F.2d 711, 712 (2d Cir. 1945)
(“[W]e think that it can make no difference whether a sale of the debtor’s prop-
erty has preceded or is made a part of the plan of reorganization.”).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012).  The section literally provides for sale by the
bankruptcy trustee.  In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy the debtor is empowered to act as
a trustee. See id. § 1107(a).
76. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 4.
77. See In re Golf LLC, 322 B.R. 874, 877 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2004) (noting “the
distinction between the purposes of § 363 and §§ 1123 and 1141” as one between
“asset sales prior to plan approval” and “sales made pursuant to a plan”); George
W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter
11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 236 (2002). But see In re Coastal Indus., Inc., 63
B.R. 361, 366–69 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (equating non-plan sales under Sec-
tions 363 and 1123(a)(5)(d)); In re Wood, 47 B.R. 774, 777 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1985) (finding non-plan sales may occur under 363(b) or 1123(b)(4)); In re
WHET, Inc., 12 B.R. 743, 750 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (noting permissive nature of
1123(b)(4) allows for pre-plan sales under section).
78. See William T. Bodoh, John W. Kennedy & Joseph P. Mulligan, The Parame-
ters of the Non-Plan Liquidating Chapter Eleven: Refining the Lionel Standard, 9 BANKR.
DEV. J. 1, 3–4 (1992).
79. Since 1994, Section 363(b) has included a provision for notification to the
antitrust authorities of a business combination implicating the Hart-Scott-Rodino
18
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ulatory oversight, which is less in the case of a 363(b) sale than in the case
of a plan sale.
1. Asset Sales as Part of the Plan of Reorganization
Business combinations may be included in reorganization plans
under Bankruptcy Code Sections 1123 and 1129.80  A reorganization plan,
including any business combination provided for, requires court approval
through the process of “confirmation.”81  The process for achieving that
approval is detailed and involved.  It requires notice and a hearing, at
which “any party in interest” may object to confirmation.82  The plan con-
firmation process provides for the participation of all stakeholders and
imposes requirements that cabin the bankruptcy court’s discretion.  That
participation is provided for by a detailed scheme of rival reorganization
plans, disclosure, and voting.83  Further protection is provided by the “fea-
sibility” requirement: Section 1129 permits plan confirmation only if
“[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation,
or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor . . . .”84
A successful vote by classes of stakeholders is a necessary, but not suffi-
cient, condition to plan approval.  A debtor seeking court approval of a
plan that includes a merger also bears the burden to establish, among
other requirements, that the plan is not likely to be followed by a future
liquidation or reorganization—that is, that the plan is “feasible.”85  The
feasibility requirement is invoked when courts consider whether to con-
firm plans proposed to be effected by a business combination.86
Feasibility is undermined in the presence of regulatory limitations
that increase the difficulty of a particular constituent element of the
plan.87  Bankruptcy courts treat the possibility of an antitrust challenge to
Act, with a foreshortened waiting period for premerger review.  11 U.S.C.
§ 363(b)(2)(B); see also H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 17–18 (1994).
80. Section 1123 dictates the required and permissible contents of a plan and
Section 1129 establishes requirements for its approval. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123; id.
§ 1129.
81. See id. § 1129.
82. See id. § 1128(a), (b).
83. See id. § 1125 (disclosure requirements); id. § 1126 (providing
supermajority voting); id. § 1129 (providing requirements for plan confirmation);
see also In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., No. 09–10235(BLS), 2010 WL
2403793, at *10 (Bankr. D. Del. June 11, 2010) (“An asset sale pursuant to a plan
of reorganization provides for a heightened degree of notice and disclosure sur-
rounding all aspects of the sale, and allows the affected creditors to vote to accept
or reject the plan, including the asset sale.”).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).
85. See id.
86. See, e.g., In re River Capital Corp., 155 B.R. 382, 387 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991)
(overruling objections to confirmation and stating “the court determines that the
inclusion of a merger or acquisition option does not render the plan infeasible”).
87. See In re TCI 2 Holdings, LLC, 428 B.R. 117, 154, 155 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010)
(explaining “proponents of [ ] Plan must also show that the new owners of the
Reorganized Debtors will not face material hurdles to achieve the necessary regula-
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a proposed business combination as a regulatory impediment that speaks
to the question of a plan’s likely successful implementation.  For example,
In re TCI 2 Holdings, LLC involved a casino bankruptcy proposed to be
resolved through a business combination.  The combination faced a feasi-
bility attack based on the prospect of antitrust challenge and a similar
state-law licensure-related proceeding testing “undue economic concentra-
tion.”88  The Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey engaged in a
detailed analysis of both the substance and the procedure of the likely
challenges before concluding that their prospects did not undermine
feasibility.89
2. Asset Sales Under 11 U.S.C. 363(b) and “Sub-Rosa” Plans
Bankruptcy Code Section 363(b) allows business combinations out of
the ordinary course of business with court approval as part of the reorgani-
zation process.90  Although “[t]he drafters of [S]ection 363 probably
thought in terms of sales of particular assets, not entire businesses,”91
courts regularly approve business combinations under the section, even in
cases as large as the Lehman Brothers and Chrysler Motors bankrupt-
cies.92  Section 363(b) asset sales frequently are preferred by debtors and
potential purchasers because they are subject to lesser interference by
stakeholders in the bankruptcy estate.93  Like plan sales, Section 363(b)
sales can serve as “means for the plan’s implementation” under Section
1123(a)(5).94
tory approvals” and concluding plan was feasible after finding “a reasonable pros-
pect of success . . . to obtain regulatory approval”).
88. See id. at 174.
89. See id. at 178.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012).
91. LOPUCKI, supra note 42, at 168 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95–595 (1977)).
92. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 445 B.R. 143, 180–81 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re
Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2009)) (discussing 363(b) sale or-
der), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by 478 B.R. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
93. The limitation on realistic stakeholder involvement is such that some have
argued that Section 363 sales are sub-rosa reorganization plans.  As a famous re-
cent example, in the Chrysler Corp. bankruptcy case in 2009, Fiat S.p.A. purchased a
substantial stake in Chrysler Corp. through a Section 363(b) out of the ordinary-
course-of-business asset sale, largely obviating the need for a full Chapter 11 reor-
ganization at all. See generally Benjamin A. Berringer, Note, “It’s All Just a Little Bit of
History Repeating:” An Examination of the Chrysler and GM Bankruptcies and Their Impli-
cations for Future Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 361, 361–62 (2010).
Section 363(b) sales offer a second advantage: to incent a sale, bankruptcy courts
frequently exercise their discretion to sell the property free and clear of interests
in, including liens on, the assets in question.  11 U.S.C. § 363(f)–(g).
94. See, e.g., Joint Plan of Reorganization § 7.1, at 18, In re Seahawk Drilling,
Inc., No. 11-20089-RSS (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 20, 2011), available at http://www
.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1452384/000119312511146870/dex991.htm
[http://perma.cc/SP6Z-EEQU] (“Pursuant to the terms of this Plan, the Sale Pro-
ceeds and the proceeds from the liquidation of the Excluded Assets will be distrib-
uted to holders of Allowed Claims and Interests.”).
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Business combinations under Section 363(b) offer less process for
challenge by stakeholders or review by regulators or other interested par-
ties.  In contrast with the detailed disclosure, voting, and confirmation re-
quirements for business combinations effected as part of a reorganization
plan, business combinations under 363(b) require “notice and a hear-
ing.”95  In contrast with the possibility of full antitrust review requiring “at
least 30 days” that the court entertained in TCI 2 Holdings, the procedures
for antitrust review of a 363(b) business combination are cut approxi-
mately in half.96
Studies of 363(b) business combinations have observed their impact
on asset prices and potential disenfranchisement of stakeholders.97  These
sales are sometimes called “sub rosa” plans, because they have the effect of
wrapping up many of the issues presented by the bankruptcy proceeding
without providing the due process required for plan confirmation.  For
this reason, courts historically were suspicious of non-plan business combi-
nations.  In an early treatment interpreting the 1938 Bankruptcy Act, the
Supreme Court held a reorganization petition filed “for the mere purpose
of liquidation” was in bad faith.98  Later courts allowed pre-plan sales
when the plans were found to be “fair and equitable” with reference to the
pre-plan sale,99 where “justifiable cause” was present,100 or when the sale
was justified by an emergency.101
Modern courts and commenters also have recognized the danger that
363(b) sales benefit a favored bidder and management of the debtor at
the expense of other bidders and stakeholders.102  A 2007 empirical study
of the effect of 363(b) asset sales concluded that fire sales produce less
value for stake-holders than do successful reorganizations.103  A recent
2014 study compared 363(b) sales to “plan sales”—those conducted as
95. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1); see also In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., No.
09–10235(BLS), 2010 WL 2403793, at *10 (Bankr. D. Del. June 11, 2010) (con-
trasting “protections for affected parties” under 363(b) versus under a reorganiza-
tion plan); In re Orfa Corp. of Phila., Nos. 90–11253S, 90–11254S & 90–11255S,
1991 WL 225985, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1991) (explaining plan sale incor-
porates same process of 363(b) and also includes disclosure and voting
requirements).
96. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b), (e)(2) (2012) (providing thirty-day waiting
period extendable by thirty additional days at enforcement agencies’ discretion),
with 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(2)(B), and 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(2) (providing fifteen-day
waiting period extendable by ten additional days at enforcement agencies’
discretion).
97. See, e.g., Bodoh et al., supra note 78, at 3–4, 8–14.
98. Fidelity Assur. Ass’n v. Sims, 318 U.S. 608, 621 (1943).
99. Patent Cereals v. Flynn, 149 F.2d 711, 712 (2d Cir. 1945).
100. Int’l Bank of Miami v. Brock (In re Dania Corp.), 400 F.2d 833, 836–37
(5th Cir. 1968) (referencing 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 625 (14th ed. 1965)).
101. In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 176 F.2d 493, 494–95 (3d Cir. 1949) (noting pre-
plan sales are confined to emergency).
102. See Anderson & Ma, supra note 4, at 3–5 (detailing criticisms).
103. See Lopucki & Doherty, supra note 3.
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part of the reorganization plan,104 concluding that, after controlling for
other variables, 363(b) sales are associated with lower sale prices than plan
sales.105  The more recent conclusion is intuitively complementary to that
from the 2007 study: both chronologically and characteristically, a plan
sale is more proximate to a full reorganization than is a 363(b) sale.
The empirical evidence supports the approach taken in the courts
and recommended by a large number of commenters of restricting access
to 363(b) sales in the absence of a “business justification.”106  In Lionel
Corp., the Second Circuit listed several factors relevant to finding business
justification, which centered on questions of the declining asset value, fair
valuation for the asset, and prejudice to remaining issues in the
bankruptcy.107
One group of authors point out that the Lionel factors will be satisfied
in a large percentage of cases.108  Consistent with that argument, a 2014
paper identifies a trend toward nearly 100% of bankruptcy business com-
binations’ taking place under 363(b) rather than under a plan.109  Some
version of the Lionel factors has been adopted in all the circuits that have
reviewed Section 363(b) business combinations.110
3. Regulatory Involvement in Plan Sales
Bankruptcy business combinations conducted as part of the plan ap-
proval process are subject to more thorough regulatory review as well.  De-
spite the automatic stay in bankruptcy, regulatory review of conduct by a
bankrupt firm is permitted to “enforce . . . police and regulatory
power . . . .”111  As the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey in
TCI 2 Holdings recognized, both state and federal regulatory issues, includ-
ing antitrust considerations, were relevant to the feasibility requirement
for plan confirmation.  The burden of proving feasibility is on the plan
104. See infra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
105. Anderson & Ma, supra note 4, at 1, 12, 17, 24–25 tbl.5.
106. See Lionel Corp. v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1066
(2d Cir. 1983).
107. See id. at 1071; see also infra notes 122–26 and accompanying text.
108. Bodoh et al., supra note 78, at 8–14.
109. Anderson & Ma, supra note 4, at 8, 18 tbl.1.
110. See, e.g., Stephens Indus. Inc. v. McClung, 789 F.2d 386, 390 (6th Cir.
1986); Institutional Creditors of Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. (In
re Cont’l Air Lines, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Summit Global
Logistics, Inc., Nos. 08–11566, 08–11568, 08–11573, 08–11574, 08–11577,
08–11579, 08–11580, 08–11581, 08–11584, 08–11588, 08–11591, 08–11593,
08–11595, 08–11597, 08–11599, 08–11600, 08–11601, 2008 WL 819934, at *9–14
(Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2008); In re Med. Software Sol’ns, 286 B.R. 431, 440–41
(Bankr. D. Utah 2002); In re Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., 124 B.R. 169, 176
(Bankr. D. Del. 1991); In re Baldwin United Corp., 43 B.R. 888, 905–06 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1984).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4); see, e.g., United States v. Air Fla., Inc., 48 B.R. 749,
751 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (reversing bankruptcy court injunction of criminal antitrust
proceedings).
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proponent, who must “demonstrat[e] that achieving the necessary [regu-
latory] approvals is not subject to ‘material hurdles’ or readily anticipated,
significant obstacles.”112  Courts eschew the alternative approach that re-
quires the relevant regulatory hurdles be surmounted before plan
confirmation.113
The detailed solicitation and voting process and the feasibility re-
quirement for confirmation work together to ensure that plan sales serve
both stakeholder and non-stakeholder interests.  Stakeholders have a voice
in the process and an incentive to protect their interests.114  Non-stake-
holders are protected by regulatory policy external to bankruptcy law, in-
cluding antitrust, which bankruptcy courts must consult when deciding
whether to confirm the plan.  Finally, the frequent reality of dissenting
stakeholders with incentives to prevent confirmation ensures regulators
will be made aware of any potential for challenging its terms.
a. Antitrust Premerger Review
One such regulatory consideration is antitrust review of the business
combination by the FTC or Department of Justice Antitrust Division.
Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, business combinations meeting certain
dollar thresholds must be disclosed to the FTC and Antitrust Division
before a transaction is consummated.115  Outside of bankruptcy, a report-
able business combination may not be consummated until at least thirty
days after reporting, permitting the FTC or Antitrust Division to investi-
gate the transaction and the market to determine whether to bring a chal-
lenge.116  The statute also gives the investigating agency discretion to seek
an additional thirty days for review of submissions made in response to a
112. In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, 486 B.R. 286, 298–99 (Bankr. D. Del.
2013) (finding sale transaction likely to succeed because “necessary approvals are
reasonably likely to be obtained”); In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 184–85 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2011) (holding that FCC approval of transfers of ownership interests to
lenders did not prevent a finding of feasibility); In re WCI Cable, Inc., 282 B.R. 457,
487 (Bankr. D. Or. 2002) (explaining buyer had obtained regulatory approvals to
acquire and to operate the business, therefore buyer had “waived any regulatory
approval contingency”); cf. In re D & G Invs. of W. Fla., Inc., 342 B.R. 882, 886
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (finding no feasibility where zoning regulations prevented
conduct necessary to reorganization plan); In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 230
B.R. 715, 747 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1999) (finding that regulatory risk was acceptable).
113. See Indianapolis Downs, 486 B.R. at 298 (“[C]ourts have not typically held
up confirmation of a plan to wait for issuance of [regulatory] approvals.”).
114. Creditors frequently use challenges for feasibility in efforts to prevent
plan confirmations, including where plans involve sales or mergers of the debtor’s
business. See, e.g., In re River Capital Corp., 155 B.R. 382, 387 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1991) (holding feasibility challenge unsuccessful).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012); see 16 C.F.R. pts. 801–803 (2015).  The reporting
thresholds for 2014 are provided at 79 Fed. Reg. 3814 (Jan. 23, 2014).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b) (listing thirty-day waiting period).  Challenges, when
they occur, take the form of applications for temporary restraining orders followed
by injunction proceedings. See, e.g., id. § 53(b).
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“second request” for documents or testimony.117  The Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act is thus said to provide a “30+30-day” waiting period prior to consum-
mation.  In practice, because the parties to the combination must comply
with the request for documents and testimony before the additional wait-
ing period begins, the investigating agency frequently enjoys ninety days
or longer to investigate and to prepare a challenge to the combination.
Plan sales do not alter the requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
Compliance with regulatory requirements is essential to establishing that
the plan is “feasible,” or “not likely to be followed by the liquidation or the
need for further financial reorganization of the debtor or any successor to
the debtor under the plan.”118  In practice, when a plan is confirmed that
contains a business combination that exceeds the filing threshold, the par-
ties to the combination must make a filing with the FTC and permit the
waiting period to expire before consummating the transaction.  This prac-
tical reality suggests that when a business combination presents antitrust
concerns, it will be unlikely to succeed under a reorganization plan.  The
bankruptcy court will be concerned at the confirmation stage with both
the certainty of at least sixty days’ delay and the uncertainty regarding the
outcome of the expected antitrust challenge.119
b. Failing-Firm Defense
A challenge to a plan sale is, like any full antitrust review of a business
combination, subject to the failing-firm defense.  Where the merging firms
can demonstrate (1) imminent equity insolvency, (2) inability successfully
to reorganize in Chapter 11, and (3) unsuccessful good-faith efforts to
elicit reasonable alternative offers, that showing will favor the plan sale’s
being permitted to proceed.120  The fact of an extant Chapter 11 proceed-
ing will facilitate, rather than undermine, the application of the failing-
firm defense, because relevant evidence should exist with regard to the
second element.
Likewise, under the feasibility standard for plan confirmation, the
likely success of a proposed plan sale will require the bankruptcy court to
evaluate the likely success of the failing-firm defense as part of its determi-
nation of the likely outcome of merger review.  A bankruptcy court should
be uniquely well-equipped to address the three elements of the defense.
The financial affairs of the debtor, the likely success of reorganization in
117. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e).
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (11); see also In re TCI 2 Holdings, LLC, 428 B.R.
117, 148 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (11)).
119. Professor LoPucki suggests that feasibility concerns have taken a back
seat to other considerations as part of bankruptcy courts’ competition for large
cases.  Lopucki, supra note 42.  Because Section 363(b) asset sales offer an alterna-
tive approach to business combinations that is more likely to evade regulatory re-
view, courts need not risk plans’ failure in order to accomplish debtors’ desired
business combinations. See infra notes 128–40 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 24–57 and accompanying text.
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the absence of the plan sale, and alternative purchasers for the debtor
company are factual questions core to both the bankruptcy court’s charge
in a particular case and its general expertise.121
2. Regulatory Involvement in “Other Than in the Ordinary Course of
Business” Sales
In contrast with plan sales, the speed, limited notice, and presumed
emergency nature of a Section 363(b) sale undermine regulatory review of
a business combination effected under that section.122  Notice to stake-
holders of Section 363(b) sales is limited to twenty-one days “unless the
court for cause shown shortens the time . . . .”123  Because of Lionel—or
comparable authority in a particular jurisdiction—the fact that a business
combination is approved under 363(b) almost by definition suggests the
court’s determination that hasty resolution of the transaction is
needed.124  Scholarship supports the proposition that courts regularly ac-
cept arguments that debtors in Chapter 11 may “melt like ice cubes.”125
According to the leading empirical study of Section 363(b) sales con-
ducted as part of a Chapter 11 proceeding, more than half of such busi-
ness combinations that take place in large, public company bankruptcies
are supported by an argument that the debtor’s assets were wasting.126
I show below that opportunities for regulatory review of a 363(b) sale
are also limited.127  Limited notice and opportunity for stakeholder in-
volvement and limited opportunity for regulatory intervention, taken to-
gether, undermine the interests of both stakeholders and non-
stakeholders.
121. Questions remain whether a bankruptcy court is appropriately incen-
tivized to make these findings in the light of the policy underlying antitrust review
of business combinations.  For a discussion on those questions, see infra note 232
and accompanying text.
122. Some indication exists that experienced antitrust attorneys appreciate,
and may take advantage of, this reality. See infra notes 135–40 and accompanying
text (discussing SunGard/Comdisco merger and Comdisco Inc. bankruptcy).  If
that is so, the value of the Section 363 sale should increase as the regulatory risk
from active merger enforcement increases.  It would be an interesting exercise to
study reliance on Section 363 to facilitate mergers during periods of active versus
less-active federal merger enforcement—for example, the Bush Administration
compared to the Obama Administration.
123. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2).  By default, objections must be made “not
less than seven days before the date set for the proposed action,” creating a four-
teen-day or shorter period after receiving notice to make objection. Id. 6004(b).
124. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 4, at 868 (“[T]he Lionel standard has evolved
to provide a blueprint for hurry-up sale motions.”).
125. See id. at 865.
126. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 3, at 30–31.
127. See generally John D. Ayer, Michael Bernstein & Jonathan Friedland, The
Intersection of Chapter 11 and Antitrust, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2006, at 18 (dis-
cussing merger review process when target entity is in bankruptcy).
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a. Antitrust Review
Section 363(b)’s text and amendment history provide evidence that
Congress contemplated a need for speedy resolution to these “other than
in the ordinary course of business” business combinations.128  Recogniz-
ing the possibility that premerger notification may be required under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Congress amended Section 363(b) in 1984 and
1994, adding waiting periods for antitrust review by the FTC or Antitrust
Division.129  The amendments provided for half of the usual waiting pe-
riod before a transaction may be consummated—fifteen instead of thirty
days—and allowed an extension up to ten days for further investigation,
compared with the usual extension of thirty days.130  The foreshortened
waiting period for antitrust review applicable to Section 363(b) business
combinations mirrors the shorter waiting period for transactions in the
nature of cash tender offers governed by the Williams Act.131  Shorter
waiting periods for antitrust review of transactions governed by the Wil-
liams Act are explained by that statute’s sixty-day limit on firm offers.132
Antitrust concerns are most likely to arise where the purchaser in a
business combination conducted under Section 363(b) is from within the
debtor company’s industry rather than financial firms or other non-indus-
try speculators.  Such an intra-industry business combination presents the
128. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012).
129. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 109, 108 Stat.
4106 (1994); Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, at § 442(b) (1984).  Prior to the 1994 amendments, the
only waiting period recognized by the Bankruptcy Code was a ten-day period after
notification.  Dispute arose as to whether that ten-day period was extendable by
thirty days on the issuance of a second request. See generally Robert B. Greenbaum
& Alan J. Meese, Premerger Review and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of Section 363(b)(2), 8
ANTITRUST MAG., Fall 1993, at 35, 35–36 (describing dispute and favoring no-ex-
tendability position); Spears, supra note 5, at 20–21 (arguing extendability posi-
tion).  In the 1994 amendments, Congress split the difference, moving to an
automatic fifteen-day waiting period that was extendable by an additional ten days
on the issuance of a second request.
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 18a (e)(2) (2012); Bankruptcy Re-
form Act § 109.
131. 15 U.S.C. 78n (d)(5); see 11 U.S.C. 363(b)(2)(B)(i).
132. Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor its amendments explains the reason
for matching the Section 363(b) waiting periods to those for cash tender offers.
Testimony before Congress during the consideration of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
explains the shorter waiting periods for cash tender offers: “The offering company
must, under the Williams Act, accept tendered stock within 60 days of tender, or
risk [the offer’s] withdrawal.” Merger Oversight and H.R. 13131, Providing Premerger
Notification and Stay Requirements: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies & Com-
mercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 80 (1976) (testimony of
Eleanor M. Fox, Esq., Simpson, Thacher & Barttlet, N.Y.C. on behalf of the Am.
Bar Assoc.).  Consistent with Professor Fox’s understanding in 1976, since 1968,
Williams Act § 14(d)(5) has permitted a tender offer to be withdrawn “at any time
after sixty days from the date of the original tender offer.”  15 U.S.C. § 78n (d)(5).
See generally ARNOLD S. JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT—TENDER OFFERS AND STOCK AC-
CUMULATIONS § 4.19 (2015 ed.) (Sec. Law Handbook Series) (discussing 1968
adoption and legislative history of Section 14(d)(5)).
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kind of competitive “overlap” that implicates the federal anti-merger
laws.133  A substantial percentage of 363(b) sales meet that characteristic.
According to two authors writing in 2007:
Our data confirm the[ ] intuition that companies from within
the debtor’s industry would be the most likely purchasers at
bankruptcy sales.  We found that two-thirds of buyers were “stra-
tegic” in that they planned to use the assets in conjunction with
their own businesses; only one-third were “financial” investors
seeking a profit on the purchase.134
In cases in which antitrust concerns do arise, intuition and anecdotal
evidence suggest the shorter periods for antitrust review undermine
agency challenge to the business combination.135  On the basis of antitrust
concerns, the Department of Justice opposed SunGard’s purchase of the
assets of its competitor Comdisco Inc. through a Section 363(b) sale con-
ducted under the control of the bankruptcy court in Chicago.
In an article published shortly after the SunGard/Comdisco transac-
tion closed, counsel to SunGard recognized the value to the federal anti-
trust authorities of “sufficient time to conduct the review and evidence-
gathering that the staff feels is necessary to convince the decision-makers
in the Agencies (and ultimately a court) that the merger should be en-
joined.”136  Counsel described a strategy of a “time squeeze,” “forc[ing]
the agency to choose between having to file suit before it is ready and
allowing the transaction to be consummated.”137  And noting the trun-
cated waiting periods applicable to the 363(b) sale procedure, counsel
continued: “the speed with which SunGard was able to complete its sub-
mission left the DOJ with less time to prepare for litigation.”138  State-
ments by the Antitrust Division support counsel’s view as to the success of
the time squeeze strategy:
The United States has conducted an accelerated review of this
matter.  An investigation was opened on August 18, 2001 and the
parties submitted their Hart-Scott-Rodino filings three days later.
The United States rapidly served subpoenas on the parties, con-
ducted numerous interviews and reviewed hundreds of boxes of
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 18; 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 11, pt. § 2.1.4, at 3 (con-
cern for loss of “[s]ubstantial [h]ead-to-head [c]ompetition”).
134. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 3, at 29.
135. Conversations with experienced practitioners support the intuition that
reduced preparation time will lead to reduced success in antitrust challenges.
136. Stephen M. Axinn, Merger Review and Litigation Involving the Acquisition of
Bankrupt Companies, 16 ANTITRUST MAG., Summer 2002, at 74, 74.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 75.
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documents.  By way of comparison, a typical investigation of this
complexity takes four to five months.139
The result in the SunGard/Comdisco business combination was an
unsuccessful merger challenge that allowed the 363(b) sale to proceed.140
b. Failing-Firm Defense
Antitrust review of a business combination effected under Section
363(b) is subject to the failing-firm defense to the same extent as any
other merger transaction.  For one example, when Hercules Offshore, Inc.
purchased Seahawk Drilling, Inc. in a Section 363(b) business combina-
tion, the parties asserted a failing-firm defense on the basis of Seahawk’s
financial distress.141  According to an article written by counsel represent-
ing the acquiring company, the failing-firm defense was the basis for the
Department of Justice’s decision to close the investigation without a
challenge.142
In the 2011 Seahawk 363(b) sale, the Justice Department closed its
investigation and “early termination” was granted on March 30th, permit-
ting the parties to consummate the transaction.143  The bankruptcy court
approved the 363(b) sale on April 5th.144  The bankruptcy court was re-
139. United States’ Redacted Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order at 4, United States v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., No.
01–2196 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2001).
140. United States v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 193
(D.D.C. 2001) (denying request for injunction).
141. Fina & Mehtal, supra note 44, at 3–4. See generally Hercules Offshore Buying
Seahawk’s Assets, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 12, 2011, http://www.chron.com/business/
energy/article/Hercules-Offshore-buying-Seahawk-s-assets-1693118.php [http://
perma.cc/9J7S-ZLYZ] (describing agreement, bankruptcy filing, and cause for
Seahawk’s financial difficulty).
142. Fina & Mehta, supra note 44, at 3–4.  The Hercules/Seahawk transaction
received an early termination, which means the investigation was closed and the
merger was permitted to proceed before the waiting period expired. See Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Notice of Early Termination, Trans. No. 20110627 (Mar. 30,
2011) [hereinafter Notice of Early Termination], available at http://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/premerger-notification-program/early-termination-notices/2011per
ma.cc06perma.cc27 [http://perma.cc/6GYB-X4VN]. See generally About Early Ter-
mination Notices, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/pre-
merger-notification-program/early-termination-notices/about-early-termination-
notices [https://perma.cc/XU7S-EGYF] (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).  From an-
nouncement to closing, the Hercules/Seahawk business combination required ap-
proximately two- and one-half months. See Hercules Offshore, Inc., Quarterly
Report (Form 10-Q), at 7, 10 (Apr. 29, 2011); Hercules Offshore, Inc., Current
Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Apr. 27, 2011); Hercules Offshore, Inc., Current Report
(Form 8-K), at 2 (Apr. 5, 2011); Hercules Offshore, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-
K), at 2 (Feb. 11, 2011).
143. See Notice of Early Termination, supra note 142; see also Hercules Off-
shore, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Mar. 31, 2011) (describing the early
termination and the legal basis for the business combination).
144. See Hercules Offshore, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Apr. 5,
2011) (describing bankruptcy court approval and transaction).
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lieved of any need to investigate the likely success of the defense by the
early termination of the antitrust investigation.
The timeline of the Hercules/Seahawk transaction demonstrates a
practical distinction between a business combination effected by a plan
sale versus a 363(b) sale.  In the first instance, the bankruptcy court will
confirm the plan on the basis of an evaluation of the likelihood of the
success in as-yet-unfinished regulatory review.  In the second instance, the
bankruptcy court will await the outcome of regulatory review before ap-
proving the sale.  In the example case of the Hercules/Seahawk Drilling
business combination, the bankruptcy court order approving the sale mo-
tion did not address the regulatory issues except to observe the provision
of notice to “the state and federal units.”145
The early termination146 of the antitrust merger review successfully
sought in the Hercules/Seahawk transaction is a common feature of
363(b) sales.  Cross-referencing the FTC’s database of early termination
notices147 with the UCLA Bankruptcy Research Database148 shows that in
a sizable percentage of business combinations effected under 363(b), the
parties achieve early termination.149  Those include business combina-
tions conducted in the context of large and politically salient bankrupt-
cies, such as Lehman Brothers, Adelphia Communications, and Enron
Corp., which one might expect in the ordinary course to draw some de-
gree of premerger investigation, if only as a matter of the optics of too-
easily allowing mergers in high-profile industries.150  Details of those inves-
tigations, apart from the fact of early termination, are not made public,
but in cases like Lehman Brothers, Enron, and Adelphia Communica-
tions, it is likely the antitrust enforcement agencies were motivated by fail-
ing-firm arguments.
145. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Debtors’ Emergency Motion
at 2 ¶ 3, In re Seahawk Drilling, Inc., No. 11–20089 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2011).
146. Colloquially called “ET”s.
147. Early Termination Notices, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/en-
forcement/premerger-notification-program/early-termination-notices [https://
perma.cc/6PCL-ZYMJ] (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).  Search conducted for “debtor”
produced early termination notices where one party (in all observed instances the
acquired party) was a debtor-in-possession in a bankruptcy reorganization proceed-
ing under Chapter 11.
148. Company Profile, UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE, http://
lopucki.law.ucla.edu/corporations.asp [http://perma.cc/KXD5-9CLW] (last vis-
ited Nov. 20, 2015) (listing all filed bankruptcies in data).
149. 36 FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO Ann. Rep. (2013)
[hereinafter HSR ANNUAL REPORT], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/36th-report-fy2013/140521hsrreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4NAL-3MJ4]. The lion’s share of all merger investigations in a given year is re-
solved through early termination.  For example, in 2013, early termination was
granted in a total of 797 of 1326 business combinations for which filings were
received. Id.
150. Compare Early Termination Notices, supra note 147, with COMPANY PROFILE,
supra note 148.
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The chronology of events for a business combination effected under
Section 363(b) raises a question whether the failing-firm defense is appro-
priate in any instance for such a transaction.  The defense requires a dem-
onstration that the bankrupt firm “would not be able to reorganize
successfully under Chapter 11 . . . .”151  The nature of a Section 363(b)
sale is that the bankrupt debtor does not attempt to reorganize its business
in Chapter 11.  Instead, the debtor files Chapter 11 with the intention of
selling the company.  For one representative example, Seahawk Drilling
stated to the bankruptcy court in 2011, it “filed these Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy cases to effectuate the terms and provisions of the [asset purchase
agreement].”152
3. Non-Reportable Transactions
Some transactions raising antitrust concerns are not subject to
mandatory reporting and waiting periods for federal agency review before
they are consummated.153  Several tests for reportability exist, all turning
in some manner on the size (in terms of dollar values) of the parties or the
size of the transaction.154  An example is the sale of Gulf States Steel assets
in a 363(b) sale conducted as part of Chapter 7 liquidation proceed-
ings.155  Although an unsuccessful bidder raised the specter of antitrust
concerns based on the involvement of a dominant competitor in the win-
ning-bidder consortium, the antitrust enforcement agencies did not re-
view the $6.3 million transaction.156
Whether those non-reportable business combinations occur in or out
of bankruptcy, they may be concluded before agencies have the opportu-
nity to review and if appropriate move to block them.  Remedying consum-
mated mergers presents a unique challenge referred to as “unscrambling
of the eggs,”157 a colorful expression invoking the challenges of recreating
competition once assets and operations have been combined and competi-
151. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 11, pt. 11, at 43.
152. Debtors’ Emergency Motion at 7 ¶ 12, In re Seahawk Drilling, Inc., No.
11–20089 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2011).  Evidence suggests this is more com-
mon than rare. See generally LOPUCKI, supra note 42, at 168–69 (acknowledging
that, in many cases, 363 sales are reason for bankruptcy filing).
153. See 16 C.F.R. pts. 801–803 (2015).
154. Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 79
Fed. Reg. 3814 (Jan. 23, 2014) (establishing updated reporting thresholds).
155. See In re Gulf States Steel, Inc., 285 B.R. 497, 504 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2002)
(noting transaction valued at $6.3 million).
156. See id. at 504 n.1 (antitrust concerns raised); see also Nancy C. Dreher,
Eleventh Circuit Rules That Sale Free and Clear in Bankruptcy Does Not Foreclose Later
Antitrust Action by Unsuccessful Bidder, BANKR. SERV. CURRENT AWARENESS ALERT,
Dec. 2006, at 1, 1 (Thomson Reuters, Westlaw Next) (“The group then contacted
the Federal Trade Commission, which did nothing.”).
157. Guide to Antitrust Laws: Mergers, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/
tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers [https://perma
.cc/7UPS-K667] (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tively sensitive information has been exchanged.158  The result is that, ex-
cept in rare cases, a consummated business combination cannot
meaningfully be remedied.159
Intuition suggests the more substantial proceedings involved in
achieving bankruptcy court approval of a plan sale160 renders non-reporta-
ble business combinations more likely to come to the advance attention of
the enforcement agencies.  For example, dissenting creditors might find
alerting the antitrust authorities to the proposed business combination to
be a profitable strategy to undermine the plan.  In contrast, rapid business
combinations conducted under Section 363(b), conducted without mean-
ingful creditor involvement, and perhaps even with a lack of meaningful
court review,161 are more likely to escape the notice of the enforcement
agencies.
III. CONFLICTING SCHEMES
Part II explained the legal and regulatory framework for the treat-
ment of merger claims in and out of bankruptcy.  In Part III, this Article
demonstrates how those rules and procedures create conflicts in which
antitrust goals are subordinated to bankruptcy policies favoring the con-
stituents of the estate.
A common result of business bankruptcies is the sale of the firm in
bankruptcy.162  Increasingly commentators observe that the sale of the
158. As an indication of the challenges inherent in this process, the Depart-
ment of Justice criminally prosecutes “gun-jumping,” or proceeding with a merger
transaction before the Hart-Scott-Rodino waiting periods have expired. See gener-
ally Richard Liebeskind, Speech at ABA Annual Meeting: Gun-Jumping: Antitrust
Issues Before Closing the Merger (Aug. 8, 2003), available at http://www.pillsbury-
law.com/siteFiles/Publications/16ADC9E2C53CF6E9F97E3F0A3F6F3242.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5RBG-ZQHW].
159. See Guide to the Antitrust Laws: Mergers, supra note 157 (“The premerger
notification requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act allow the antitrust agencies
to examine the likely effects of proposed mergers before they take place.  This
advance notice avoids the difficult and potentially ineffective ‘unscrambling of the
eggs’ once an anticompetitive merger has been completed.”).  The unscrambling-
of-the-eggs concern is less likely to arise in a pure acquisition as opposed to a
merger context.  In Gulf States, the winning consortium later sold the assets for a
substantial profit. See Dreher, supra note 156, at 1.  Such a remarketing demon-
strates the business operations of the bankrupt debtor were never meaningfully
combined with the purchaser, and an antitrust challenge could have remedied an
illegal merger (had it been found to occur).
160. See supra notes 150–56 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 42, 92–96 and accompanying text.
162. According to the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, over
the decade from 2004–2013, 17% to 42% of all large public company bankruptcies
disposed of each year were concluded with a Section 363(b) sale of all or substan-
tially all assets. See UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE, 363 SALES OF ALL
OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL ASSETS IN LARGE, PUBLIC COMPANY BANKRUPTCIES, AS A PER-
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firm may be the purpose of the bankruptcy filing.163  Prominent defend-
ers of that result argue that bankruptcy sales move assets to their highest
value use,164 while leading critics argue that Section 363(b) sales of an
entire firm benefit purchasers and insiders to the prejudice of diffuse
stakeholders.165  Existing commentary ignores the question treated in this
Article: the impacts of sales of firms in bankruptcy on non-stakeholders
(like consumers) or on external regulatory policy (including antitrust).166
A. Bankruptcy Business Combinations Are Intended to Maximize Value
for Investor Interests
“The purpose of a § 363(b) sale is to maximize the benefit to the
debtor’s entire estate.”167  Commentators agree.  In spite of their conflict-
ing arguments and conclusions, leading theorists and empirical scholars
studying 363(b) sales start from the same initial premise that the bank-
ruptcy reorganization process is intended to maximize the value of the
firm’s assets.  “In the same spirit,” as Ronald Coase’s baseline premise in
The Nature of the Firm,168 two commentators writing in the law-and-econom-
ics tradition contended in 2002 that bankruptcy “reorganization law ought
to begin by ascertaining the value of keeping particular assets together
inside a given firm.”169  Their conclusion that bankruptcy asset sales are
appropriate substitutes for reorganizations relies on the premise that in
the modern economy, most assets are not firm specific, so value may be
maximized by bankruptcy asset sales.170  Dissenters from that view none-
theless also see the core goal of Chapter 11 as maximizing estate value.171
They observe with regard to judicial supervision of bankruptcy sales,
“[b]ankruptcy law charges bankruptcy judges with the responsibility to
prevent inadequate-price sales.”172
163. See LOPUCKI, supra note 42, at 169 (citing TWA bankruptcy as lead ex-
ample); Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 751 (same).
164. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 751, 756, 786–88; see also JACKSON,
supra note 10, at 219, 223.
165. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 3, at 10 (reporting empirical result
that Section 363(b) sales produce depressed value for assets).  Anderson & Ma
recently showed that LoPucki and Doherty’s empirical result was limited to 363(b)
sales rather than plan sales.  Anderson & Ma, supra note 4, at 1.
166. Other external regulatory policies exist as well.  For example, the FCC
has become involved in review of bankruptcy asset sales that implicated broadcast
license ownership regulations. See Ilene Knable Gotts, Nathaniel L. Asker & Jack
N. Goodman, US Antitrust and FCC Treatment of Acquisitions of Distressed Communica-
tions Businesses, 6 COMPETITION L. INT’L, Apr. 2010, at 11, 14–15.
167. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01–00056(PJW), 2001 WL 1820326,
at *11 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2001).
168. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–92 (1937).
169. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 758.
170. See id. at 786.
171. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 3, at 3.
172. Id. at 4.
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Bankruptcy is lauded for facilitating these transactions and thereby
preserving the going concern value of the enterprises.  The asserted bene-
fits are two-fold: first, by selling a bankrupt firm as a going concern, a
bankruptcy court maximizes the value of the firm.  As a going concern, the
firm was worth the discounted value of expected future profits.  In liquida-
tion, the asset value is limited to the aggregate of tangible and semi-tangi-
ble inputs, which have limited viable alternative uses.  The value-
maximizing result is good for investors in the firm, a class that includes
creditors, employees, equity investors, contracting partners, and the com-
munities in which the firm’s facilities are located.
Second, by selling the firm as a going concern, the broader economy
benefits through the maintenance of a productive business.  In the ab-
sence of a bankruptcy sale, the firm may have ceased operations.173  Had
that occurred, the firm would not be manufacturing widgets; people
would not be employed in running the business; contracting partners and
communities would be impacted; creditors would go unpaid; and the as-
sets that went into the organization would be dissipated to the four winds,
possibly redeployed to lower value uses.  The same two-part justification
holds for any business combination transaction in which one firm’s failure
is a realistic consequence of the transaction’s failure, including some per-
centage of business combinations conducted under protection of the
bankruptcy court.174
B. Bankruptcy Business Combinations May Present Antitrust Concerns
Antitrust law’s anti-merger provision, Clayton Act Section 7,175 is also
implicated by these business combination transactions.  Before combining
in 2014, US Airways and American Airlines were two of five remaining
major domestic air carriers operating in an industry with oligopoly charac-
teristics, including price leadership and demonstrated limited willingness
173. Evidence points to the contrary, which may explain why American and
US Airways did not assert a failing-firm defense to the Justice Department’s com-
plaint to block the merger. See Defendant AMR Corporation’s Answer (and Af-
firmative Defense) to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, United States v. US Airways
Grp., Inc., 979 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:13–cv–1236 (CKK)), 2013 WL
5376689.
174. See, e.g., In re Trans-World Airlines, 2001 WL 1820326, at *14 (Bankr. D.
Del. Apr. 2, 2001).
[T]here is a substantial public interest in preserving the value of TWA as
a going concern and facilitating a smooth sale of substantially all of
TWA’s assets to American.  This includes the preservation of jobs for
TWA’s 20,000 employees, the economic benefits the continued presence
of a major air carrier brings to the St. Louis region, and preserving con-
sumer confidence in purchased TWA tickets American will assume under
the sale.
Id.
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012) (rendering illegal mergers or asset sales that
would “tend to create a monopoly”).
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to compete head-to-head in city-pair routes.176  The merger presented
substantial competitive concerns.177  The level of consolidation in the air-
line industry in the wake of that merger is sufficiently great that it can be
expected to be functionally irreversible in the absence of dramatic indus-
try shake-up.178
American Airlines’ purchase of bankrupt Trans-World Airlines in
2001 was, on its face, likewise a matter of competitive concern.  Both
American and TWA were nationwide legacy carriers with route systems
concentrated around Midwestern US hubs (St. Louis for TWA, Chicago
for American) and with significant trans-Atlantic presences.179  Statements
entered into the record at a February 2001 Senate Hearing on airline con-
solidation noted substantial concerns for increasing consolidation in the
airline industry.180  According to testimony entered into the record by the
General Accounting Office, on some metrics the American-TWA business
combination presented greater concerns than did proposed (non-bank-
ruptcy) business combinations of airlines including United/US Airways
and Northwest/Continental Airlines, both of which failed after Justice De-
partment opposition.181  TWA entered bankruptcy specifically to facilitate
a business combination that had been planned in advance of TWA’s
filing.182
176. See Complaint at 3, US Airways, 979 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2013) (No.
1:13–cv–1236).
177. See HSR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 149, at 12 (“The complaint alleged
that the transaction, as originally proposed, would substantially lessen competition
for commercial air travel and result in passengers paying higher airfares and re-
ceiving reduced service.  In addition, the transaction would reduce competition in
the market for slots at National Airport where the merged carrier would control
almost 70% of the slots.”).
178. See Danielle Kurtzleben, Regulators Sue to Stop American Airlines-US Airways
Merger, but Why Now?, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2013/08/13/regulators-sue-to-stop-american-airlines-us-airways-merger-
but-why-now [http://perma.cc/34GP-KWMY] (“My instinct is we’re reaching that
tipping point . . . .  When you get down to four airlines that effectively own air
service in the U.S., these players are too big for any new entrants to come in and be
a serious competitive threat going forward.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
It is difficult to imagine what changes might suffice, but technological innovations
comparable to the Internet replacing home operating systems as consumers’ pri-
mary means of electronic interface may be required.
179. See Effects of American Airlines/TWA Transaction Hearing, supra note 58.
180. See id.  Most of the comments favored the merger because of concerns
for lost economic value and jobs and other effects of liquidation, although a few
found the concerns for consolidation to exceed the harms from liquidation.
181. See id. at 44 (statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Dir., Physical Infrastructure
Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office); J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Remarks Before the Regional Airline
Association President’s Council Meeting: Antitrust for Airlines 6–7 (Nov. 3, 2005),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-airlines [http://perma
.cc/4MGU-45FN]. See also generally Joel G. Chefitz, A Tale of Two Mergers: American/
TWA and United/USAir, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 215, 215–16 (2002).
182. See LOPUCKI, supra note 42, at 169.
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SunGard’s purchase of Comdisco was a business combination taking a
three-firm market to a duopoly in a market for “shared hotsite disaster
recovery services for large scale enterprise computer processing cen-
ters,”183 with the combined company expected to control 71% of the mar-
ket.184  The Justice Department further alleged that SunGard and
Comdisco were “viewed as the two closest, and sometimes the only, bid-
ders . . . .”185  An already concentrated market became a duopoly over a
lawsuit by the Justice Department seeking injunctive relief.  The bank-
ruptcy business combination was approved although Hewlett Packard
Corp. was a competing bidder for the bankrupt Comdisco, Inc.186  Had
Hewlett-Packard purchased the assets, the competitive concerns would
largely have been obviated.187
Financial News Network’s (FNN) 1992 sale to General Electric, the
parent company of CNBC, was a merger bringing a two-firm market to a
monopoly.  At the time the two were the only 24-hour financial news
broadcasters—FNN had pioneered the now-common concept of news with
a stock ticker across the bottom of the screen.  Such mergers to substantial
concentration threaten consumer harm as the surviving firms gain the
power to control prices, quality, choice, and the level of output.
Bankruptcy sales can be expected to occur most frequently where
competitive overlaps exist.  A sale of a company that must be conducted
quickly is most likely to attract buyers with expertise in the relevant indus-
try because of their information advantage.188  If an effort is made to max-
imize the value received at the sale, buyers that stand to gain from
synergies between the business of the bankrupt debtor and their own busi-
ness will place a premium on the company for that reason.  Likewise, buy-
ers who anticipate acquiring market power by combining the bankrupt
debtor’s capacity and market share with their own will place a premium on
the company for that reason.
183. See Redacted Complaint, United States v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 172 F.
Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C. 2001) (No. 01–2196), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/case-document/sungard-data-2-9384 [http://perma.cc/B7A3-M9RZ].
184. See United States v. SunGard Data Sys. Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C.
2001); Redacted Complaint, supra note 183, at 10–11.
185. Redacted Complaint, supra note 183, at 11–12.
186. See Company News; Comdisco Agrees to Sell Unit to Hewlett Packard, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/31/business/company-
news-comdisco-agrees-to-sell-unit-to-hewlett-packard.html [http://perma.cc/
TK6K-LNBN].
187. See United States’ Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order at 25 & n.62, United States v. SunGard Data Sys.,
Inc., No. 01–2196 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2001) (describing Hewlett Packard as a “fringe
competitor” currently unable to serve large customers), available at http://www
.justice.gov/atr/case-document/sungarddataredactedmemorandum#N_62_.
[https://perma.cc/T5M4-63G9?type=image].
188. Out-of-industry buyers will need to bear time and cost to compete in the
bidding process.
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The theory is supported by empirical evidence.  In a 2007 study of
363(b) sales, two authors found that “data confirm their intuition that
companies from within the debtor’s industry would be the most likely pur-
chasers at bankruptcy sales.  We found that two-thirds of buyers were ‘stra-
tegic’ in that they planned to use the assets in conjunction with their own
businesses . . . .”189
C. Categorizing Conflict Cases
In analyzing the conflict between bankruptcy law’s reorganization
objectives and antitrust law’s competition concerns, it is useful to catego-
rize business combination transactions in which both issues are present.
In one category of cases, the reorganization objectives can be accom-
plished without prejudice to competition concerns through a business
combination with a competing bidder.  In a second category of cases, reor-
ganization objectives can be accomplished without any business combina-
tion’s taking place.  In a third category of cases, reorganization objectives
can only be achieved through a business combination transaction.  It is
only in this third category that the tension between bankruptcy and anti-
trust may be irreconcilable.  The third category also implicates the anti-
trust law failing-firm defense.
1. Competing Bidders
Cases exist in which the business combination that took place was un-
necessary to accomplish the economic goals of the bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion.  A competing bid may have presented lesser competitive concerns.
Hewlett Packard challenged the bankruptcy court’s approval of the Sun-
Gard-Comdisco merger because it would have liked to purchase Comdisco
in order to enter the market as a competitor, preserving the pre-combina-
tion level of competition while also ensuring the assets remained in the
market.  Dow Jones and Westinghouse fought the CNBC-FNN merger be-
cause those firms would have liked to buy the Financial News Network.
These cases demonstrate the conflict between bankruptcy and anti-
trust, because the bankruptcy court sought the strongest of the available
bids, even where those strongest bids presented greater competitive con-
cerns.  Bankruptcy courts have limited incentive to consider the less an-
ticompetitive alternative transaction.190
189. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 3, at 28–29.  This phenomenon has been
observed historically as well. See id. at 12 (noting similar conclusion from study
using data from 1980s).
190. One counterintuitive result of the LoPucki/Doherty study might be that
a slower sale process would serve both the interests of bankruptcy and those of
antitrust better than a fire-sale approach.  A longer shopping period for the bank-
rupt debtor might engage the antitrust enforcement agencies earlier; might enable
purchasers who present lesser competitive concerns to evaluate and participate in
the bidding; and might diminish management preference for 363(b) sales over
plan sales, causing more business combinations to take place through the antitrust-
deferential plan sale process.  At the same time, LoPucki and Doherty’s work, to-
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2. No Business Combination Necessary
A business combination may be unnecessary to preserve the bankrupt
firm’s assets in the marketplace.  American Airlines had successfully reor-
ganized in Chapter 11, returning to profitability, before the bankruptcy
court approved the US Airways business combination.  This category
might frequently involve a firm that reaches an agreement to enter a busi-
ness combination transaction and files bankruptcy to facilitate the
combination.191
According to one empirical study, this category is implicated in a fair
number of 363(b) sales.192  These authors analyzed thirty 363(b) sale
transactions and concluded that the value produced in those fire sales was
substantially less than the value produced by a Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion.193  A possible corollary of that conclusion is that in a fair number of
363(b) sales, the fire sale was not necessary to effectuate the value-maxi-
mizing purposes of bankruptcy; a plan sale or a full reorganization might
have been a superior approach.194
3. Irreconcilable Conflict: Anticompetitive Combination Essential to
Reorganization
In other cases, some form of asset sale or merger conducted under a
bankruptcy court’s supervision may be necessary to preserve the value of
the firm.  It is unlikely that TWA could have emerged from its 2001 bank-
ruptcy filing to provide air passenger service as a free-standing firm.195  As
the bankruptcy court found, “In TWA’s case, a sale pursuant to § 363 is
the only viable alternative for preserving and capturing the enterprise
gether with Anderson and Ma’s recent article, suggest the goals of estate value
maximization would be better accomplished under such an approach.
191. Filing to facilitate the business combination is not always an indication
that the business combination is unnecessary to preserving value.  For example, in
the American Airlines/Trans-World Airlines business combination and that of
Seahawk Drilling, Inc. and Hercules Offshore, Inc., both were true failing-firm sto-
ries, but both also involved a bankruptcy filing specifically intended to facilitate the
business combination. See supra notes 141–82 and accompanying text; see also, e.g.,
Fina & Mehta, supra note 44, at 4 (describing Hercules/Seahawk business combi-
nation undertaken as asset sale under Bankruptcy Code Section 363(b) after filing
bankruptcy (citing In re Seahawk Drilling, Inc., No. 11–20089 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
Feb. 12, 2011))). See generally LOPUCKI, supra note 42, at 167–80 (describing forum
shopping to facilitate approval of business combinations under Section 363).
192. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 3.
193. See id.
194. Anderson and Ma followed up LoPucki and Doherty’s study by compar-
ing the results of 363(b) sales with those of plan sales, finding that plan sales re-
turn substantially more to the stakeholders than do 363(b) sales. See Anderson &
Ma, supra note 4.  That conclusion suggests that both a later sale and a reorganiza-
tion are viable alternatives to many 363(b) sales.
195. Effects of American Airlines/TWA Transaction Hearing, supra note 58 (testi-
mony of Michael E. Levine, Adjunct Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch.) (“I do
not think [the American/TWA business combination] eliminates competition in a
meaningful way because I think TWA is, in fact, a failing company.”).
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value of TWA’s assets.”196  Evidence suggests no suitors were realistically
available other than American.197  In general, transactions in this third
category include those in which both (1) no other bidder is available and
(2) a sale of the bankrupt firm is the only possibility for maintaining the
assets operating in the market of concern.
Transactions with these characteristics satisfy both bankruptcy goals,
which seek to maximize estate value, and antitrust goals, which seek to
preserve assets in the market rather than to permit the value lost by out-of-
market liquidation proceedings.  These transactions should be permitted
whether pursued during bankruptcy or outside of bankruptcy.
Cases in this third category should, in every instance, satisfy the anti-
trust law failing-firm defense.  By definition, reorganization in Chapter 11
is not possible; alternative purchasers presenting lesser competitive con-
cerns are not available; and the firm is facing imminent insolvency.198  In
the case of the American Airlines/TWA merger, the Justice Department
granted early termination of the merger investigation.199
D. Why Anticompetitive Business Combinations Succeed in Bankruptcy
The prior sub-part identified three categories of bankruptcy business
combinations defined by the level of antitrust concern presented.  Theory
suggests cases in which the substantive standards of bankruptcy and of an-
titrust conflict will not be rare but will arise in the normal course.  It is
precisely that which makes bankruptcy business combinations attractive to
bankruptcy estate constituents that also renders them problematic as a
matter of competition policy.  When a company or asset is put up for bid,
its most significant competitor should be the highest bidder.
196. In re Trans World Airlines Inc., No. 01–00056(PJW), 2001 WL 1820326,
at *12, *14 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2001) (“Given TWA’s precarious financial his-
tory, I found that a rejection or denial of the Sale Motion would have resulted in
an immediate and precipitous decline in the financial affairs of TWA with a very
high probability, if not certainty, of liquidation.  A liquidation would result in ma-
terial adverse harm to TWA’s diverse creditor constituencies and loss of enterprise
value.”); McDonald, supra note 181, at 9.
197. See Effects of American Airlines/TWA Transaction Hearing, supra note 58, at
26 (testimony of William F. Compton, President and CEO, Trans-World Airways)
(“Only American Airlines saw fit this winter to come forward with a proposal that
was not merely an offer to cherry-pick a prized asset here and a prized asset there.
American proposed a comprehensive solution that will realize for our creditors the
value of TWA as a going concern . . . .”).  Other potential bidders, including Conti-
nental Airlines and a group including financier Carl Icahn, did not produce bids
in compliance with the bidding procedures. See Trans World Airlines Inc., 2001 WL
1820326, at *6–7.
198. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 11, pt. 11 (noting requirements for
defense).
199. See 20011333: AMR Corporation; Trans World Airlines, Inc. (Debtor-in-Posses-
sion), FED. TRADE COMM’N, (Mar. 16, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/en-
forcement/premerger-notification-program/early-termination-notices/20011333
[https://perma.cc/DFN6-6QBH?type=image] (granting early termination).
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss5/1
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-5\VLR501.txt unknown Seq: 39 15-DEC-15 10:03
2015] WORLDS COLLIDING 877
There are two reasons for that expectation.  First, the most significant
competitor is experienced and established in the relevant market.  It has
the wherewithal to use the assets efficiently.  Second, that competitor
stands to realize a monopoly premium from the business combination.200
The combination either creates a position of market dominance with the
attendant pricing power or it solidifies a position of dominance that it
already had.  Of those two reasons, the first may reflect synergies from the
merger and may be beneficial, although nothing suggests that the syner-
gies between the dominant competitor and the bankrupt firm are greater
than synergies that less harmful business combinations might present.
The second reason—pricing power from the combination—is purely
harmful.
1. Irreconcilable Goals
Bankruptcy business combinations have, as one goal, the maximal
value of the bankruptcy estate.  Antitrust has the goal of preventing harm
to consumers that results from dominance.  Bankruptcy law’s value max-
imization goal looks to effects on the investing interests in the bankrupt
firm.  The goal is effectuated, in part, through rapid consummation of
transactions where wasting asset value is a concern.  As a matter of bank-
ruptcy policy, mergers or asset sales that produce supra-normal returns are
desirable.
Antitrust looks to effects on the market other than the investor inter-
ests of the bankrupt firm.201  Antitrust goals depend on economic effi-
ciency.  Merger review under antitrust law is not concerned with rapid
consummation of transactions, but rather with the accuracy of the agen-
cies’ and courts’ evaluations of the net consequences of a transaction.202
Although neither the law nor public expressions of policy so indicate, ob-
servers understand that delay may be a deliberate strategy for merger
enforcement.203
2. Bankruptcy Procedures Undermine Antitrust Review
Bankruptcy relies on a system of specialized non-Article III courts
charged with maximizing the value of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of
the constituents of the bankruptcy estate.  Bankruptcy courts are also con-
200. These same explanations exist when the failing-firm defense is applied
outside of bankruptcy. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
201. Under some views of the role of antitrust in economic regulation, extra-
market effects also are relevant.
202. The accuracy goal of antitrust is also reflected in the standards for
merger review.  Courts analyze mergers under the notoriously complex Rule of
Reason rather than the more efficient but blunt instrument of per se illegality or
legality.
203. For example, the grant of a preliminary injunction, though it does not
literally forbid a merger in perpetuity, has that practical effect because the merg-
ing parties are not willing to wait or invest resources in fighting the case at a per-
manent injunction proceeding.
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stitutionally competent to hear matters “arising in” or “related to” those
bankruptcy proceedings, although the extent of that competence is the
subject of recurring dispute.204  Antitrust claims have been treated as
within the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction in cases including Financial News
Network,205 although constitutional challenges to bankruptcy court juris-
diction have not been litigated in the context of review of antitrust claims.
Substantial questions exist whether bankruptcy courts, faced with specific
incentives and limited experience, are institutionally capable of giving full
attention to antitrust policy concerns.206
Under the Financial News Network rule, bankruptcy courts have juris-
diction to decide complex antitrust questions through a process of refer-
ence from United States district courts.207  That jurisdictional authority
does not necessarily mean they must decide these issues.  Procedures are
available for district courts to “withdraw the reference” and require the
bankruptcy court to abstain from deciding an issue, sending the matter to
the district court for decision.208  No consistent rule for withdrawing the
reference has emerged in the courts.  Academic literature does not con-
tain a theoretical argument supporting any bright-line rule.
The Bankruptcy Code and Hart-Scott-Rodino Act contain an abbrevi-
ated premerger notification process, shortening by one-half to fifteen days
the period for initial government review of the proposed merger, and by
two-thirds to ten days the subsequent waiting period after full compliance
with a government request for further information, before consummation
of the merger or asset sale.209  Those abbreviated waiting periods reflect a
policy favoring quick resolution of proceedings to avoid wasting assets and
204. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
205. See In re Fin. News Network, Inc. 126 B.R. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
206. Those favoring less antitrust enforcement applaud that result. See, e.g.,
Greenbaum & Meese, supra note 129, at 37 (“The [bankruptcy] court is more
likely to possess the experience necessary to appreciate fully the exigencies of the
situation. . . .  to evaluate the antitrust issue most likely to predominate, the appli-
cation of the failing firm defense.”).
207. See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2012); id. § 157(a).
208. See id. § 157(d).
209. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(2) (2012).  Enacted in 1976 as an amendment to
the Clayton Act, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires merging parties to give the
federal antitrust enforcement agencies advance notice of an intended merger or
asset sale that exceeds certain thresholds of economic relevance. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a (2012).  The Bankruptcy Code originally did not include any reference to
the requirement of pre-merger notification. See Act of November 6, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, § 363(b), 92 Stat. 2549.  Paragraph (b)(2) was added in 1984, includ-
ing a ten-day waiting period after notification to the enforcement agencies, with no
statutory waiting period after compliance with the second request. See Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 442, 98 Stat. 333
(1984).  This may be in part because Congressman Peter Rodino, one of the co-
sponsors of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, was Chairman of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee in 1984. See Peter W. Rodino, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pe-
ter_W._Rodino [http://perma.cc/7P6Q-BN8R] (last modified Oct. 13, 2015).  In
1994, Section 363(b)(2) was amended to include the double waiting period—fif-
teen days prior to second request, ten days after substantial compliance—that cur-
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to ensure creditors are compensated.  They are likely insufficient for full
merger review and are also insufficient to permit enforcers to adequately
prepare for litigation to block the merger or asset sale.  Sophisticated
firms understand that the bankruptcy forum is preferable for bringing
about a successful merger over government opposition.
Neither the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code nor the aca-
demic literature justifies foreshortened procedures in bankruptcy.  Com-
mentators favoring bankruptcy or antitrust acknowledge competing
justifications for their preferred approaches.  On one hand, bankruptcy
involves a “need for speed,” supporting foreshortened waiting periods.
On the other hand, serious antitrust review takes time, supporting longer
waiting periods.210
3. Antitrust Agency Review of Business Combination Transactions Under
Section 363(b)
Section 363(b) explicitly recognizes the need for federal antitrust re-
view of mergers or asset sales beyond a certain minimum size, as has been
dictated by the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act since 1976.211  This section
requires notice to the appropriate agencies for a “reportable transaction”
for which notice would be required outside of bankruptcy, determined by
the size of the parties, size of the assets, or value of the securities involved
in the transaction.212
Since amendments to the section in 1994, Section 363(b) has incor-
porated waiting periods to allow for agency review of the proposed trans-
action.213  HSR waiting periods for bankruptcy sales or mergers are
truncated relative to the non-bankruptcy review periods in the HSR Act.
Outside of bankruptcy the initial waiting period is thirty days, followed by
an additional thirty days after party compliance with a so-called second
request for documents and testimony regarding the transaction.214  In an
asset sale or merger conducted in bankruptcy under Section 363(b), the
initial waiting period is fifteen days and the period after a second request
is ten days, identical to the waiting periods for a cash tender offer.215
rently exists. See Act of August 19, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-394, § 109, 88 Stat. 792
(referencing 15 U.S.C. § 18a).
210. See, e.g., Greenbaum & Meese, supra note 129; Spears, supra note 5.
211. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
212. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
213. Prior to 1994 there was confusion with regard to the waiting periods to
be applied.
214. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a.  Parties not infrequently voluntarily agree to extend
one or another of these periods if they believe they can convince the agencies not
to sue to block the merger.
215. See id.  When the Bankruptcy Code was amended in 1994 to adopt the
15+10 dual waiting period structure, the usual waiting period was 30+ 20, so the
bankruptcy and cash tender offer waiting periods were exactly 1/2 of the usual
periods.  When the usual period was amended to 30+30, taking effect in 2001, the
bankruptcy and cash tender offer periods did not change. See Janet Ridge, Interim
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The most likely explanation for the shorter waiting period in bank-
ruptcy is the concern for wasting asset value while the firm is operating
under the cloud of Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.  Rapid reorganiza-
tions are believed to preserve estate value.  Courts and commentators fre-
quently refer to the necessity of speed in bankruptcy proceedings.216
Congress too has recognized, without explanation, the value of speed in
bankruptcy reorganizations.217  Arguments that time is of the essence are
not frequently supported with empirical evidence.218  The policy of en-
couraging speed at all costs serves the interests of the constituents of the
bankruptcy estate, who will realize any benefit from preserving asset value
while bearing a de minimis share of the harm from an anticompetitive
business combination.219
HSR Rules Published, ANTITRUST L. UPDATE (Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Wash.
D.C.), Jan. 25, 2001, https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_
Shared_Content/Files/Editorial/Publication/Interim%20HSR%20Rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2SD-ZFRY].
216. See, e.g., Ira L. Herman, Statutory Schizophrenia and the New Chapter 11, 2
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 30 (2007) (discussing “second policy imperative” of Chapter
11 bankruptcy as being “the need for speed” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Commission’s Recommendations Concerning the Treatment
of Bankruptcy Contracts, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 474 n.84 (1997) (citing
NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT
451 (1997)); see also In re Lewis, 147 B.R. 37, 38 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (“[I]t was
the duty of the Bankruptcy Court to speed proceedings and to monitor reorganiza-
tion cases very closely” in service of goal to preserve shareholder value (citing
United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365
(1988))); Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Easter Air Lines, Inc. (In re Ionosphere
Clubs, Inc.), 105 B.R. 765, 771 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to permit arbitra-
tion proceeding to continue during Eastern Air Lines bankruptcy, noting that “al-
lowing the arbitration to proceed would usurp the bankruptcy court’s critical role
in the reorganization proceedings, affect special bankruptcy interests, and thwart
the goal of judicial speed and economy which is particularly necessary for the reha-
bilitation of this Debtor”), vacated on other grounds, 922 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1990); In
re Sw. Oil Co., 84 B.R. 448, 453 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987) (“Speed is the thrust of
the 1978 Reform Act, as it pertains to reorganization under Chapter 11.”).
217. See H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 222 (1977) (“[M]ore often than not, speed
in the reorganization attempt is more important to success than the scope of the
reorganization.”).
218. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 4, at 862.
219. Speed may frustrate rather than advance estate value maximization
goals.  For example, asset values may be best realized after careful preparation and
sale procedures. Cf. In re Nellis, 12 B.R. 770, 772 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (citing
legislative history to the Bankruptcy Code regarding the differences between a sale
by a “‘careful and diligent businessman’” and a liquidation sale) (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 95–595, at 339).  Professor Westbrook has noted, “[p]art of the essence of
reorganization bankruptcy—heresy though it may be to say it—is delay, within rea-
son.”  Westbrook, supra note 216, at 474.  Delay serves the quintessentially bank-
ruptcy goals of permitting the debtor “breathing room” to reorganize. Id.
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4. Short Review Periods Undermine Merger Challenges and Present Forum-
Shopping Concerns
Short agency review periods for reportable business combination
transactions under 363(b) might also be justified on the basis of a prefer-
ence for those transactions’ consummation, in spite of antitrust concerns.
Waiting periods permit the antitrust enforcement agencies to reach judg-
ments about the relative costs and benefits of a proposed transaction
through discovery-like processes including issuing subpoenas for docu-
ments, interviewing third-party witnesses, taking depositions of party wit-
nesses, and hiring and preparing economic and industry experts.220
At the end of the waiting periods, the agencies must sue to enjoin the
transaction or risk its prompt consummation.  Where consummation oc-
curs, unwinding a merger or substantial asset sale can be difficult or im-
possible.  Remedying transactions post-confirmation regularly is likened to
“unscrambl[ing] the egg.”221  On the flip side of the coin, a transaction
that is blocked—even preliminarily—frequently fails to proceed.222  The
expectation of a permanent injunction after a preliminary injunction has
issued is sufficiently great to cause deals to unwind.
Requiring agency counsel to litigate over a transaction with less than
the sixty-day review period is likely to undermine their ability to success-
fully enjoin anticompetitive transactions.  As one example, expert testi-
mony may be difficult or impossible to prepare in the twenty-five days
permitted by the foreshortened review periods for bankruptcy mergers or
asset sales.  Careful consideration of theories of antitrust liability is diffi-
cult to accomplish, even with full waiting periods, to say nothing of the
abbreviated periods provided for 363(b) sales.
In contrast, the merging parties have advance knowledge of both
their planned transaction and the likely agency response, so they are not
prejudiced by the short preparation time.  One example is SunGard Data
Systems’ purchase of Comdisco Inc. in a Section 363(b) sale conducted as
part of Comdisco’s bankruptcy proceedings.  Counsel to SunGard pub-
lished an article regarding the sale after the U.S. District Court denied the
sought injunction.  Counsel noted that, having anticipated the Antitrust
Division’s requests for documents and information, the merging parties
were able to respond to those requests immediately on receiving them,
limiting the Antitrust Division to the statutory twenty-five days.223  That
strategy seems likely to have undermined the Division’s ability to effec-
tively litigate against the transaction, which involved a sophisticated and
220. See MERGER REVIEW PROCESS, supra note 14.
221. See FTC v. Univ. Health Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1217 n.23 (11th Cir. 1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
222. Consider, for example, the recent preliminary injunction against the
proposed sale of US Foods to Sysco.  The parties abandoned the transaction rather
than continue litigating at the permanent injunction stage of proceedings.
223. Axinn, supra note 136.
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difficult to establish theory of the relevant antitrust market.224  Counsel’s
retrospective article on the SunGard/Comdisco business combination sug-
gests that forum shopping by first filing bankruptcy may have been the
parties’ explicit intent.
5. 363(b) Transactions Undermine Antitrust Goals in Other Ways
Nothing about Section 363(b) ensures that antitrust concerns relating
to a business combination transaction pursued under that section are
respected.  Bankruptcy courts have broad authority to allow or to deny the
proposed sale of assets.  That authority is highlighted in Section 105(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code, which permits courts to “issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
this title.”225  Bankruptcy courts cite the Section 105(a) power to supple-
ment Section 363(b) when approving business combinations.226
Nothing in Section 363(b) or elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code
prescribes standards cabining the bankruptcy court’s decision.  Case law
limits discretion to ensure business combinations serve the goals of maxi-
mizing estate value and increasing the likelihood of success in reorganiza-
tion.227  Bankruptcy courts do not seek to accomplish other social policy
goals when evaluating requests to sell assets or firms under Section
363(b).228
The Section 363(b) asset sale process does a poor job of accommodat-
ing antitrust concerns.  Even if they had appropriate incentives to do so,
bankruptcy courts do not enjoy discretion to give weight to the objections
of antitrust enforcement agencies or private antitrust plaintiffs when re-
viewing mergers or asset sales conducted under Section 363(b) during the
pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding.
224. One might argue that the existence of longer review periods outside of
bankruptcy increase the likelihood that an agency forced to litigate on a foreshort-
ened clock will be unsuccessful.  Agency counsel may be accustomed to a pace of
preparation that is inconsistent with operating under bankruptcy court supervi-
sion.  Courts may be accustomed to receiving presentations of evidence that are
much more robust than is possible on a shorter clock.  It is possible that neither
counsel nor courts are sufficiently flexible to adjust to the alternative procedures.
225. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
226. See, e.g., In re AMR Corp., No. 11–15463(SHL), 2013 WL 2643174, at *2,
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2013).
227. See Asarco, Inc. v. Elliot Mgmt. (In re ASARCO LLC), 650 F.3d 593, 601
(5th Cir. 2011) (stating sale should comport with an “articulated business justifica-
tion for using, selling, or leasing the property outside the ordinary course of busi-
ness” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ginger Root Office Assocs., LLC v.
Farmer (In re Advanced Packaging & Prods. Co.), 426 B.R. 806, 816 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (applying abuse of discretion standard of review); see also Institutional Credi-
tors of Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. (In re Cont’l Air Lines, Inc.),
780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lio-
nel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying busi-
ness judgment rule).
228. See Command Performance Operators, Inc. v. First Int’l Servs. Corp. (In
re First Int’l Servs. Corp.), 25 B.R. 66, 70 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982).
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A variety of more specific concerns with asset sales under Section
363(b) exist.  There is no reporting process for mergers or asset sales that
do not meet the HSR threshold, threatening the possibility that those sales
occur without antitrust review.229  There is no express requirement that
non-stakeholders in the bankruptcy proceeding may appear to challenge
the merger or sale.230  Merger challenges that go to trial outside of bank-
ruptcy may be tried to a jury, while claims tried before a bankruptcy court
do not include a jury right.231
6. Bankruptcy Courts Make Poor Antitrust Judges
Bankruptcy judges are institutionally ill-suited to render decisions on
merger matters, which represent one of the most complex and policy-
laden areas of antitrust review.  First, bankruptcy judges can be expected
to be unschooled in antitrust decision-making relative to generalist district
court judges.  Second, bankruptcy judges are trained to think in terms of
protecting investor interests in firms in bankruptcy to the exclusion of
non-investor interests, including consumers and society at large.  Third,
appellate review of bankruptcy court decisions is frequently less robust
than appellate review of decisions by trial courts in other litigation set-
tings.  Finally, evaluation of bankruptcy judges, who are not life-tenured,
turns on their success deciding bankruptcy issues.
These realities regarding the institutional competence of bankruptcy
courts to hear antitrust matters explain the apparent, but unstated,232 re-
luctance of the antitrust enforcement agencies to bring merger challenges
before bankruptcy courts.  In cases discussed in the remainder of this Part,
both the FTC and the Antitrust Division have endeavored, with differing
degrees of success, to ensure their anti-merger arguments were heard by
district courts rather than by bankruptcy courts.
229. This concern is not specific to bankruptcy proceedings, but it is possible
that the circumstances of bankruptcy, including rapid reorganizations, may exacer-
bate the effect of non-reporting by undermining the ability of the agencies or
would-be complainants to learn of and act on the proposed merger or sale.
230. As a practical matter, bankruptcy courts appear willing to hear chal-
lenges brought by the enforcement agencies.
231. This concern arises if private plaintiffs rather than federal agencies bring
the merger challenge.  Federal merger challenges either occur before the Federal
Trade Commission or in district court; in the latter case a jury is highly unlikely.
232. Efforts to study agency decision-making in this regard have been unsuc-
cessful due to agency assertions of privilege from Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) disclosure of documents or information reflecting decision-making
processes.  However, conversations with attorneys and managers with both enforce-
ment agencies, as well as knowledgeable observers, support the conclusion of re-
luctance to proceed in the bankruptcy forum.
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E. Representative Cases and Degrees of Antitrust Enforcement Success
In Part III(A)–(D), this Article categorized business combination
transactions pursued in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding.233  The
first category involved competing bidders, where the bankruptcy reorgani-
zation goals (but not necessarily value maximization goals) could be
achieved without the anticompetitive business combination transaction.
The second, related category involved a business combination transaction
that was unnecessary to accomplish a reorganization.  Such a category
could only be justified on the basis of value maximization.  The third in-
volved a business combination transaction without which the reorganiza-
tion would have been impossible.
From 1991 to the present, an increasingly sophisticated approach to
merger enforcement in the context of bankruptcy has developed.  Lessons
from the FTC’s Financial News Network debacle informed the Antitrust Divi-
sion’s approach in Comdisco.  The Antitrust Division’s litigation failure in
Comdisco improved its own approach to merger enforcement in the con-
text of the AMR Corporation bankruptcy.
1. In re Financial News Network
One example of the conflict between antitrust law’s merger policy
goals and a bankruptcy asset sale proceeding is the litigation involving the
Federal Trade Commission and state attorneys general over the sale of
Financial News Network to General Electric, the parent company of com-
petitor Consumer News and Business Channel.  The proposed transaction
was a merger to monopoly in the market for cable financial news report-
ing.  The FTC’s aborted effort to block the merger between General Elec-
tric (CNBC) and bankrupt firm Financial News Network represents an
early and naı¨ve attempt to block a bankruptcy business combination on
the basis of antitrust concerns.
Westinghouse Corp. offered a competing bid for the Financial News
Network assets.  Had the bid succeeded, FNN would have continued to
compete with CNBC, retaining a duopoly in the market.  Every indication
was that Westinghouse, a conglomerate that competed with CNBC-owner
GE in many product lines, was a legitimate competing bidder for the FNN
assets.
Because of the Westinghouse bid, even if FNN would have been un-
likely to reorganize in bankruptcy, the FNN sale to GE could not be justi-
fied on the basis of the failing-firm defense.  The bankruptcy court
rejected the Westinghouse bid on the basis of bid procedures favoring GE.
Bid procedures are established on the basis of value maximization goals
and the rejection of the Westinghouse bid is evidence of favoring value
maximization over the competitively preferable alternative.
233. See supra notes 167–232 and accompanying text.
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The FTC appealed the bankruptcy court’s determination that it had
jurisdiction over the agency’s antitrust challenge to the business combina-
tion with successful bidder GE.  After the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction
over the antitrust challenge was upheld, the agency dropped its
challenge.234
2. In re Comdisco
Another example of this conflict is the Antitrust Division’s challenge
to the acquisition by competitor SunGard Data Systems of bankrupt Com-
disco, Inc., a merger that created a duopoly in the market for electronic
data storage services.235  SunGard/Comdisco involved a Section 363(b)
business combination undertaken in the course of Comdisco’s bankruptcy
proceeding in Chicago.236  The Antitrust Division’s litigation against Sun-
Gard’s purchase of Comdisco ten years after Financial News Network showed
lessons learned from the Financial News Network bankruptcy, but once
again reflected the difficulties presented by the jurisdictional overlaps be-
tween bankruptcy and antitrust proceedings.
Hewlett Packard was a possible alternative bidder for the Comdisco
assets.  Because Hewlett Packard was not a competitor at the time, its bid
would preserve three firms operating in the market.  Like the GE-FNN
transaction, a failing-firm defense would be unavailable to support the
SunGard-Comdisco business combination.
The Justice Department opposed the business combination.  It first
sought to preclude the bankruptcy court’s approving the 363(b) transac-
tion by sending a letter to the bankruptcy court indicating its intent to
challenge the transaction as a violation of the Clayton Act.  The bank-
ruptcy court returned the Justice Department’s letter unopened.  Bank-
ruptcy proceedings were nonetheless stayed while the Justice Department
234. Information explaining the FTC’s decision to drop the challenge to the
business combination is not publicly available.
235. For another example, consider the American Airlines purchase of the
assets of Trans-World Airlines Inc. in 2001.  American’s bid for TWA succeeded
despite a competing bid by industry insiders who planned to maintain TWA as a
free-standing competitor. See New Bidder for T.W.A. Emerges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/08/business/new-bidder-for-twa-emer
ges.html [http://perma.cc/PL34-XR7D] (discussing bid for TWA assets by Jet Ac-
quisitions Group, which intended to continue to operate TWA assets as free-stand-
ing airline).
236. Professor LoPucki lists the Comdisco bankruptcy as one of several that
reflected that bankruptcy court’s participation in the competition for major com-
pany bankruptcies in the early part of the prior decade.  It seems likely the anti-
trust advantage made the bankruptcy forum—and in particular the Section 363(b)
mechanism—more attractive than seeking to effect the business combination
outside of bankruptcy or through a plan sale. See supra notes 125–37 and accompa-
nying text.  It would be an interesting inquiry whether the hope of easy confirma-
tion of the proposed business combination enhanced the attractiveness of the
Chicago forum.
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proceeded with a challenge to the proposed business combination in fed-
eral district court.
Antitrust counsel for the merging parties conducted its defense to the
expected merger challenge in a manner that maximized the advantage
from the short waiting periods for agency review of business combinations
under 363(b).  By preparing in advance and complying quickly with the
anticipated government’s second request, the parties to the business com-
bination were able to limit Justice Department review of the proposed
combination to the bare minimum waiting period provided for in Section
363(b)—approximately a month—before the government filed its com-
plaint seeking an injunction.237
The apparent result was a hastily prepared Justice Department
merger challenge in a complex economic sector.  The challenge unsur-
prisingly failed on the basis of a problematic market definition.  The Sun-
Gard/Comdisco business combination, which dramatically reduced
competition in the market relative to the alternative combination with
Hewlett Packard, succeeded because of procedures for 363(b) sales that
favor hasty consummation of business combinations at the expense of
careful antitrust review.
3. In re AMR Corp.
The US Airways/American Airlines business combination shows a sec-
ond category of transaction that was unnecessary to realizing the benefits
of keeping the bankrupt firm’s assets operating in the market of concern.
The bankruptcy court approved the business combination in June 2013,
applying Section 363(b) as informed by the bankruptcy court’s general
equitable power.238  In the American Airlines bankruptcy and US Air-
ways/American Airlines merger, the Antitrust Division’s approach to
merger review and enforcement in the context of a bankruptcy proceed-
ing reflected lessons learned over two decades since Financial News Network.
The transaction reduced the number of major competitors in the
market from five to four, leading to further consolidation in a market al-
ready characterized by a small number of major firms and well-understood
to possess oligopoly characteristics.  From the perspective of antitrust law,
its consummation raises fundamental concerns.  As the Justice Depart-
ment claimed in its August 2013 complaint seeking to enjoin the transac-
tion, industry consolidation and the elimination of maverick competitor
US Airways threatened harm to consumers in the form of increased prices
and decreased service on a large number of domestic city-pair routes.239
237. Internal agency deliberations are not publicly available, making it diffi-
cult to know the impact of the parties’ defense strategy on Justice Department
deliberations.
238. See In re AMR Corp., No. 11-15463(SHL), 2013 WL 2643174 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2013) (applying 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b), 105(a)).
239. On one hand, the CEO of the combined firm publicly predicted, “As the
largest airline in the world, we should be the most profitable . . . .” See Susan Carey
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Theory suggests that the US Airways/American Airlines business com-
bination, by conferring pricing power on the combined firm, should re-
present a high-value opportunity for the constituents of the bankruptcy
estate.  Stock market results post-merger suggest the theoretical expecta-
tion has borne out.  Market observers noted extraordinary profit potential
for equity investors in bankrupt AMR Corp., who, according to conven-
tional bankruptcy wisdom, might have expected to lose their entire
investment.240
4. Why the Problem Remains
Knowledgeable observers continue to question whether the merger
enforcement in US Airways/American Airlines, which was conducted in
parallel with the American Airlines bankruptcy proceeding, was as success-
ful as it might have been if conducted outside of bankruptcy.  Too, bank-
ruptcy remains a notoriously localized practice, and the success of merger
enforcement when the bankruptcy proceeding is before one particular
bankruptcy court judge says little about a future merger matter in parallel
with a bankruptcy proceeding taking place in a different jurisdiction.  In
particular, considering incentives to forum shop and broad discretion fac-
ing bankruptcy counsel with regard to where to file, a filing made in a
bankruptcy court with judges less inclined to be deferential to antitrust
concerns might be a strategic ploy.241
Based on evidence from the US Airways/American Airlines merger,
enforcers’ experience can mitigate the challenges of investigating and
challenging a merger in parallel with a bankruptcy proceeding.  Theoreti-
cal potential remains for suboptimal antitrust enforcement when bank-
ruptcy courts are uncooperative and merging parties seek maximal
advantage from the foreshortened waiting periods.  Necessity remains for
a theoretically sound and pragmatic solution to the conflicts.
& Jack Nicas, American Airlines, US Airways Complete Merger, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10,
2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303560204579247
953849152692 [http://perma.cc/R334-BTNF] (quoting Doug Parker, CEO, US
Airways) (internal quotation marks omitted).  On the other hand, a white paper
publicized by the American Antitrust Institute analyzed efficiency claims in airline
mergers and concluded efficiencies have rarely been realized. See DIANA L. MOSS,
AM. ANTITRUST INST., DELIVERING THE BENEFITS? EFFICIENCIES AND AIRLINE MERGERS
3–10 (2013), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/AAI_USAir-
AA_Efficiencies.pdf [http://perma.cc/LWY4-3N9N].  The conflicting understand-
ings of the profitability of a business combination transaction like that of US Air-
ways and American Airlines can be explained by the expectation that the
combined firm will enjoy substantial pricing power.
240. “It ‘was just about the best bankruptcy ever,’ said Starke, a managing
director at CRT Capital Group in Stamford, Conn.  ‘It’s insane how well it turned
out.’” See Bill Rochelle, Shares of Old AMR Stock Are Gaining Value, Analyst Says,
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.star-telegram.com/
2013/12/18/5429015/shares-of-old-amr-stock-worth.html [http://perma.cc/
3JTK-7JHL] (quoting Kevin Stark, industry analyst).
241. On discretion and forum shopping generally, see LOPUCKI, supra note
42.
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IV. OPTIMAL RECONCILIATION
Part III identified deep and enduring conflicts between antitrust
merger control and bankruptcy business reorganizations.  Differences in
goals between business bankruptcies and competition policy suggest that
conflicts will arise whenever there is a substantial bankruptcy in a concen-
trated industry.  Those have been frequent in recent decades, and the rep-
resentative cases in the prior sub-part show that conflicts do arise.  This
Part is the first effort to identify which policy should prevail in seeking the
optimal legal and regulatory approach to mergers in declining industries.
A. A Clash Between Groups of Diffuse Claimants
Both bankruptcy and antitrust can be understood as seeking to miti-
gate disparities in bargaining power that emerge when constituents are
unable to protect their own interests in bilateral bargaining with the firm.
Upstream investor interests include employees, communities, creditors,
and equity investors (suppliers of labor, geography, capital, and entrepre-
neurship) and are diffuse relative to the bankrupt firm.  That relative dif-
fusion undermines those investors’ bargaining power vis-a`-vis the firm: a
large percentage of the individual investors lack the ability to dictate terms
or to demand timely compensation.  The opposite problem arises when
the bankrupt firm’s relationship with consumers is considered.  Like inves-
tors, consumers are too diffuse to protect their individual interests when
bargaining with the bankrupt firm.
It is less obvious that the interests of the diffuse investors are opposed
to the interests of the diffuse consumers.  The Chapter 11 reorganization,
including the asset sale or merger conducted as part of it, can be seen as
sharing economic value from the market in which the firm operates be-
tween upstream claimants (investors) and downstream claimants (consum-
ers).  The consumers benefit if the asset or firm is diminished, improving
their bargaining position in relation to it.  The investors benefit if the asset
or firm is enhanced, increasing the value to be distributed among them.  If
the economy is static, the situation is zero-sum: a benefit realized by either
class of claimants is offset by a loss suffered by the other class of claimants.
The zero-sum nature of this tug-of-war between consumers and inves-
tors operating in the market in which the assets or firm operate(s) ex-
plains why the conflict between bankruptcy law’s estate value
maximization goal and antitrust law’s consumer protection goal is irrecon-
cilable.  This refined understanding also enables steps toward an optimal
balance between the competing policy goals.
B. Diffuse Claimants Lacking Ex Ante Bargaining Opportunity Must Prevail
In the tradition of law-and-economics that dominates both antitrust
and business bankruptcy scholarship and policy-making, this Article asserts
that economic efficiency is a guiding principle in analyzing both antitrust
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law and bankruptcy law.242  Bargaining disparity produces market failures
leading to inefficient resource allocations.  Regulatory intervention can be
appropriate to correct for such market failure.243
Evaluating which set of claimants is more diffuse and therefore in
greater need of legal intervention to mitigate the market failure caused by
bargaining disparity helps to resolve the conflict between and antitrust
and bankruptcy.  In the ordinary circumstance, the more diffuse set of
claimants will be consumers.  Investors frequently band together in the
form of labor unions and pooled capital investment schemes such as mu-
tual funds.  Creditors are themselves sophisticated and capital-intensive
enterprises.
In contrast, consumers typically bargain individually, competing
against one another for scarce opportunities to contract with suppliers in
the industry.  Economic theories of collective action demonstrate consum-
ers are unlikely to interact collectively to protect their collective best inter-
ests.  The antitrust enterprise exists to protect those interests, which the
bargaining process frequently undermines.
Stakeholders in bankruptcy proceedings, including creditors, equity
investors, and employees of the bankrupt firm, have the further advantage
of an opportunity to bargain ex ante to protect their interests in the con-
text of bankruptcy.  Stakeholders have the ability to assess the risk of con-
tracting with the debtor firm before its filing and adjust contract terms on
the basis of those risks.  For example, creditors may take security interests,
gaining the protections of security including first right to recovery from
the debtor’s assets.244  Other creditors adjust the terms of their credit rela-
tionship, including interest charges or repayment schedules, based on risk
assessments.  Equity holders adjust the prices they pay for ownership of the
debtor’s equity shares to reflect concerns for loss in bankruptcy.  Finally,
even employees, the least well-protected of the stakeholders, have some
ability to recover wages due245 and to bargain for payment terms in light
of expectations regarding the firm’s failure.
In contrast, in the ordinary course, consumers do not form advance
contract relationships that give them stakeholder status in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.  Exceptions to this general reality include long-term contracts
that place a consumer in the position of a creditor246 and down payments
242. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Colum. Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20
(1979) (noting antitrust serves economic efficiency); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert
E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’
Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 155–56 (1989); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason
and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
12–13 (1977).
243. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 343 (3d ed.
1986); Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139,
214 (2005).
244. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a)–(b), 725 (2012).
245. See id. § 507(a)(4).
246. See id. § 365.
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on consumer goods that have the same effect.247  In the ordinary course,
consumers are pure non-stakeholders who rely on the preservation of effi-
ciency in the industry but have little to no ability to enforce that goal
through their own action.
C. Ties Should Break in Favor of Merger Enforcement Policy
The totality of considerations favors antitrust law’s merger policy
goals over bankruptcy’s value maximization goals.  Even where equally dif-
fuse, the localized constituents of the bankruptcy estate are better posi-
tioned than the consumers to protect their interests.  Shareholders and
creditors both are in contract relationships with the bankrupt firm.  Those
contracts are subject to negotiation.  The interests of the shareholder and
creditor counter-parties can be protected through negotiation.
For these reasons, we are willing, outside of bankruptcy, to prefer con-
sumer interests to shareholder and creditor interests.  We will subject
firms and, derivatively, their owners and creditors to financial penalties for
anticompetitive conduct, including illegal mergers.  The only difference
between the non-bankruptcy and bankruptcy circumstances is the timing.
Analogizing to the principle of Butner v. United States,248 equity holders
and creditors should not be better off in bankruptcy than they were out of
bankruptcy.
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Part IV explained the optimal reconciliation of the conflict between
antitrust merger review and bankruptcy business reorganizations as one
that favors the goals of antitrust.  Reform is necessary to bring about that
reconciliation.  In this part, the Article offers paths to reform to correct
for a status quo that suffers from a tendency toward false negatives in the
application of antitrust policy to business combinations conducted under
the supervision of a bankruptcy court.  The possible approaches include
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code as well as changes to interpretations
of the Code in its current form.
A. Reorganization Plans Better Protect Antitrust Review of Bankruptcy
Business Combinations
Moving to greater use of plan sales versus Section 363(b) sales for
bankruptcy business combinations is the most direct and obvious route to
mitigate the tension between the policies of bankruptcy law and those of
antitrust.  The feasibility test for plan approval under Section 1129
promises the best check on the use of the bankruptcy forum to effect busi-
ness combinations that violate the Clayton Act.  Merger review procedures
247. See id. § 507(a)(7).
248. 440 U.S. 48 (1979), superseded in statute, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106.
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under that section allow for full review, conducted under the normal
30+30 day waiting period mandated in the HSR Act.249
The incentives facing bankruptcy courts at the plan confirmation
stage are different than the incentives at the time of an out-of-the-ordi-
nary-course-of-business asset sale or merger conducted under Section
363(b).  Instead of seeking to maximize asset value to enable a reorganiza-
tion to occur, the plan confirmation process seeks to ensure that a busi-
ness structure is in place that will permit a firm to continue to be
successful after confirmation.250  The legality of a business combination
conducted as part of a plan of reorganization is inextricably linked to the
feasibility of the reorganization.251  Stakeholders in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding have incentive and opportunity to bring problematic proposals
for business combinations to the attention of the antitrust enforcement
agencies, mitigating problems of non-reportable transactions evading anti-
trust review.252
Unlike in the context of Section 363(b) sales, which one writer argues
are part of a race-to-the-bottom competition among bankruptcy courts,
courts do not stand to benefit by confirming plans that immediately fail
due to antitrust challenges to business combinations.253  The reputational
penalty to a court associated with plan failure caused by a court’s en-
joining the transaction would be greater than in the context of failures
that occur over a longer time horizon.  Such a failure-by-injunction would
be immediate and readily traceable to a failing in the plan confirmation
process.254
Legislative change might give effect to what is generally agreed to be
the real thrust of Section 363(b)—sales of assets, not entire businesses—
with the effect of shifting business combinations to the plan confirmation
stage of proceedings.  Such an amendment might include as part of para-
graph (b)(1): “Any sale of all or substantially all of the property of the
estate may be conducted under this section only if the court determines
after notice and a hearing that confirmation of a plan under this Chapter
is highly unlikely to succeed.”255  The hypothetical amendment preserves
the 363(b) sale option for emergency cases but narrows the current “busi-
ness rationale” requirement, through which most such sales are justified.
The likely success of the hypothetical amendment, even if enacted, is sub-
249. See supra notes 215–17 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
253. But cf. LOPUCKI, supra note 42, at 137–40, 167–80 (arguing that Section
363(b) business combinations are indication of corrupted reorganization
proceedings).
254. But cf. id. at 97–122 (recognizing plan failure as regular feature of mod-
ern large public company reorganizations but fact of high failure rates are not
ascribed to bankruptcy courts’ failures).
255. The language draws on the “plan sale” paragraph of the Bankruptcy
Code, Section 1123(b)(4).
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ject to question: two authors argue that the “melting ice cube” argument
for 363(b) sales has been accepted as a matter of course, suggesting that
courts might simply begin to conclude that plans can never succeed.256
B. Withdrawing the Reference for Antitrust Merger Challenges
One resolution to the concern that expertise and institutional incen-
tives favor value maximization over antitrust goals would be to challenge
the results of Section 363(b) asset sales in district court, relying on the
bankruptcy court to hold off on its decision approving the sale until the
district court decides the antitrust claim.  Withdrawal of the reference with
regard to antitrust review of assets sales would be an elegant mechanism
resolving the tension between the bankruptcy court’s estate-value-max-
imization goals and competition policy concerns raised by the asset sale.
The Judiciary Code provides:
The district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so withdraw
a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the pro-
ceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of
the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting
interstate commerce.257
In operation, the mandatory withdrawal approach would involve a chal-
lenger to a bankruptcy asset sale appearing in bankruptcy court, raising
that challenge, and moving the district court to withdraw the reference to
decide the antitrust issue.258  Bringing this approach into the mainstream
would involve either common-law interpretations of Section 157(d) that
require withdrawal when a Clayton Act challenge is brought to a bank-
ruptcy business combination or changes to the bankruptcy reference pro-
cedure imposed by district court rule.
1. Mandatory Withdrawal in Operation
Petitioning the district court to “withdraw the reference” is a means to
move proceedings from the bankruptcy court—where they may be heard
only by reference from an Article III judge—to a federal trial court.  Such
a move has two clear benefits.  First, federal district courts are generalist
courts, frequently with some experience in antitrust matters, while bank-
256. See generally Jacoby & Janger, supra note 4.
257. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (2012).
258. As a formal matter, withdrawal of the reference could occur in one of
two ways.  First, proceedings that are considered “non-core” are required to be
reviewed de novo by the referring district court on the timely objection of any
party. See id. § 157(c)(1).  A determination that an antitrust challenge to a bank-
ruptcy asset sale is non-core would change the fact-finder to a tribunal less likely to
be predisposed to allow the transaction.  Second, even when a proceeding is core,
an interested party may seek to have the district court exercise its discretion to
withdraw the reference “for cause shown.” Id. § 157(d).  Withdrawal occurs by mo-
tion made to the district court. FED. R. BANKR. P. 5011.
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ruptcy courts are specialized tribunals whose judicial work is focused en-
tirely on federal bankruptcy law.  At least one commentator has noted that
bankruptcy judges may be myopic with regard to non-bankruptcy mat-
ters.259  Second, bankruptcy proceedings are directed entirely to maximiz-
ing estate value and not to the broader economic impacts of the
proceedings as those economic impacts affect entities that are not constit-
uents of the estate.
Under the broadest interpretation of Section 157(d), the mere neces-
sity of resolving an antitrust challenge would be a basis for mandatory
withdrawal.  This approach reads the word “consideration” to mean what
it says—if the court must “consider” antitrust law, withdrawal is required.
This approach has been pejoratively called the “literal theory.”260  Most
courts have refused to read the word “consideration” so broadly for fear of
“creat[ing] an ‘escape hatch’” that “would eviscerate much of the work of
[the] bankruptcy courts.”261  The prevailing interpretation of 157(d)
reads “consideration” to mean “material and substantial consideration,”262
suggesting both that the consideration of antitrust (or other federal) law
must be material to the outcome and that the amount of consideration is
significant.
Several courts have held the standard to be met in the presence of
antitrust claims.  In Lifemark Hospitals v. Liljeberg Enterprises, claims that con-
tracts involving the debtor were illegal tying arrangements presented a ba-
sis for mandatory withdrawal when the claims did not present per se
violations of the antitrust laws.  Instead, the court must decide, “among
other things, definition of the relevant product and geographic market
area, and determinations of whether competition was unreasonably re-
strained by a tying or exclusive dealing agreement, whether a particular
hospital lease constituted a tying product, and whether debtor’s conduct
constituted an unfair trade practice.”263  This was “more than routine ap-
plication of established [antitrust] law.”264  In In re National Gypsum Co.,
patent claims with antitrust counterclaims “necessarily entailed material
and substantial consideration of non-Code federal law,”265 and in Burger
King Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, a creditor’s trademark claims and the debtor’s
259. See Cole & Zywicki, supra note 7, at 511.
260. See Hvide Marine Towing, Inc. v. Kimbrell (In re Hvide Marine Inc.), 248
B.R. 841, 843 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
261. See Am. Body Armor & Equip., Inc. v. Clark (In re Am. Body Armor &
Equip., Inc.), 155 B.R. 588, 590 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (quoting In re Adelphi Inst., Inc.
v. Terranova, 112 B.R. 534, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 63 B.R.
600, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
262. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3–57 (17th Ed. 2015) (citing cases).
263. See Lifemark Hosps. Inc. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc. (In re Liljeberg Enters.,
Inc.), 161 B.R. 21, 25 (E.D. La. 1993).  The court cited Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11–17 (1984), for the standard for tying claims.
264. See Lifemark Hosps., 161 B.R. at 25.
265. See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. (In re Nat’l Gypsym Co.), 145
B.R. 539, 542 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
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antitrust and RICO counterclaims met the standard.266  And in Michigan
Milk Producers Ass’n v. Hunter, antitrust counterclaims presented a basis for
mandatory withdrawal because they required “substantial and material
consideration of federal antitrust claim[s].”267  The counterclaim in ques-
tion “alleged that a supply agreement entered into between [creditor] and
[debtor] was in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.”268
2. Narrowing Interpretations of 157(d)
Although several examples exist of antitrust issues that satisfy the pre-
vailing Section 157(d) standard for mandatory withdrawal, there are limits
to relying on this approach.  First, none of the successful arguments arise
in the merger context.  Second, courts paying close heed to narrowing
interpretations of 157(d) have often reached the opposite conclusion on
antitrust claims.  Third, the most extreme narrowing interpretation of Sec-
tion 157(d), advanced by a small minority of courts and a leading bank-
ruptcy treatise, would almost certainly prove insurmountable in the
context of any merger challenge to a bankruptcy business combination.
a. Interpretation, Not Application
One commonly accepted narrowing interpretation of the mandatory
withdrawal provision speaks to the degree of “interpretation” of the non-
bankruptcy that is required.  The Seventh Circuit in In re Vicars Insurance
Agency distinguished between “mere application” and “interpretation,”
outlining three approaches from the “least restrictive end of the spec-
trum” to the “most restrictive interpretations” of 157(d).269  The In re Vic-
ars Insurance Agency court preferred the middle approach: “mere presence
of a non-title 11 issue, even if that issue is outcome determinative,” is not
sufficient to invoke mandatory withdrawal (although permissive with-
drawal remains available), but neither is it essential that “non-title 11 is-
sues ‘dominate[ ]’ bankruptcy issues.”270  Instead, “consideration of both
title 11 and other laws of the United States” involves a court’s “un-
dertak[ing] analysis of significant open and unresolved issues regarding
266. See Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kan., Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 731 (D. Kan.
1986).
267. See Mich. Milk Producers Ass’n v. Hunter, 46 B.R. 214, 216 (N.D. Ohio
1985).
268. Id. at 215.
269. See In re Vicars Ins. Agency, Inc., 96 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
City of N.Y. v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 63 B.R. 600, 603 (S.D.N.Y.
1986)).
270. See id. at 953 (citing Contemporary Lithographers, Inc. v. Hibbert (In re
Contemporary Lithographers), 127 B.R. 122, 127 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (providing per-
missive approach); In re Lenard, 124 B.R. 101, 102 (D. Colo. 1991) (providing
restrictive approach)).
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the non-title 11 law” as distinct from “mere application of existing law to
new facts.”271
Courts have held that the elements of mandatory withdrawal are not
met when antitrust claims other than merger issues are raised in bank-
ruptcy, although only rarely in cases in which the antitrust issues were
squarely presented and fully articulated.  In Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa
Air Group, Inc., the antitrust issues were raised in counterclaims, where the
original claims were within the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction as core pro-
ceedings.272  Noting both that “the antitrust and other federal law issues
in this case appear to be straightforward and not matters of first impres-
sion” and that “Mesa has not identified those portions of the antitrust laws
which it contends will require substantial and material consideration,” the
Hawaiian Airlines court concluded mandatory withdrawal was not
required.273
There is only one example of a mandatory withdrawal motion being
addressed in the context of a merger challenge to a bankruptcy business
combination.  Both the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of
Illinois, continuing their litigation to enforce the Sherman Act after the
Federal Trade Commission abandoned its challenge to the CNBC/FNN
transaction, moved the district court to withdraw the reference.274  Noting
circuit precedent that suggested withdrawal might be mandatory if the
matter involved “significant interpretation of CERCLA,” the district court
271. See id. at 954; see also United States v. Delfasco, Inc., 409 B.R. 704, 707 (D.
Del. 2009) (distinguishing “‘substantial and material’ consideration of federal law”
(withdrawal mandatory) from “straightforward application of a federal law” (not
mandatory)).
272. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Air Grp., Inc., 355 B.R. 214, 218–23
(D. Haw. 2006).
273. See id. at 223. Hawaiian Airlines can thus be explained as a failure to
fulfill a burden of proof. See also Hvide Marine Towing, Inc. v. Kimbrell (In re
Hvide Marine Inc.), 248 B.R. 841, 843 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (holding no mandatory
withdrawal for oblique reference to “unlawful monopolistic activities in violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act” and other federal law).  Other cases refusing
mandatory withdrawal in the presence of antitrust issues do not involve meaning-
ful assertions of antitrust issues to be decided.  The district court in In re Mathson
Industries, Inc. held that a claim of collusion affecting the outcome of a Section
363(b) asset sale, while couched as antitrust issue (bid-rigging), was actually a
claim about the application of Bankruptcy Code Section 363(n), which imports
the bid-rigging standard into the bankruptcy code as a reason to set aside a bank-
ruptcy sale.  408 B.R. 888, 891 (E.D. Mich. 2009).  It was irrelevant that “the exis-
tence of a Sherman Act violation would help Plaintiff prove her claim . . . .” Id.  In
an analogous case, assertion of state-law antitrust claims that would be decided by
reference to analogous federal law did not provide a basis for mandatory with-
drawal, because the federal law was not binding.  Kiep v. Turner, 80 B.R. 521, 524
(D. Haw. 1987).
274. See Dow Jones/Grp. W Television Co. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 127 B.R. 3, 4 &
n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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held that a merger challenge was a “mere application of established anti-
trust principles to new facts.”275
Such a narrow interpretation of Section 157(d) undermines a policy
of mandatory withdrawal whenever antitrust merger issues are presented
in the context of a bankruptcy business combination.  Enacted in 1950,
the Clayton Act has existed in substantially its current form for more than
six decades.  Since 1968, increasingly sophisticated versions of the Guide-
lines have been considered, promulgated, and generally accepted.  Most
mergers brought to the antitrust enforcement agencies for review are per-
mitted to proceed without challenge and even minimal investigation using
the early termination procedure.  The core challenge in merger litigation
is the application of complex facts to well-established legal principles.  A
party seeking to have a matter removed to the district court would be
hard-pressed to argue that the merger challenge meets the In re Vicars In-
surance Agency standard for mandatory withdrawal.
b. “Only One Law”
One pair of commentators opposed mandatory withdrawal for ques-
tions of merger enforcement arising in reorganization cases under a more
extreme narrowing interpretation of the mandatory withdrawal stan-
dard.276  These opponents of mandatory withdrawal base their arguments
on interpretations of Judiciary Code Section 157(d), requiring withdrawal
“on timely motion of any party . . . if the court determines that resolution
of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of
the United States.”277  They argue that the only law being interpreted is
the Clayton Act because Section 363(b) is not subject to different interpre-
tations.  A small minority of lower courts follow this “only one law”
approach.278
That interpretation of Section 157(d) is wrong-headed.  Every bank-
ruptcy court decision approving a business combination (whether as part
of a plan or under 363(b)) necessarily interprets the Bankruptcy Code.279
275. Id. at 4–5 (citing City of N.Y. v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir.
1991)) (noting withdrawal may be mandatory if interpretation of CERCLA is
required).
276. See Greenbaum & Meese, supra note 129, at 37; see also COLLIER, supra
note 262, at 3–62 (noting “probably the correct way [to read Section 157(d)] is
that the district court is not required to withdraw” proceeding only presenting an
antitrust issue).
277. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (2012).
278. See, e.g., Brizendine v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 143 B.R. 877, 878–89
(N.D. Ill. 1992); Monterey Mushrooms, Inc. v. Carolina Produce Distribs., Inc. (In
re Carolina Produce Distribs., Inc.), 110 B.R. 207, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1990); Sibarium
v. NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank, 107 B.R. 108, 111 (N.D. Tex. 1989); In re System Freight,
No. 90-4908, 1991 WL 33150, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 1991); Block v. Anthony Tam-
maro, Inc. (In re Anthony Tammaro, Inc.), 56 B.R. 999, 1006 (D.N.J. 1986).
279. Cf. Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kan., Inc., 64 B.R. 728, 731 (D. Kan.
1986) (stating resolution of relief requires application of bankruptcy law, but not
requiring any showing of interpretive difficulties surrounding bankruptcy issues).
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If antitrust questions are also present, then “both title 11 and other laws of
the United States” language of Section 157(d) is satisfied.280  The “only
one law” argument also ignores the justification for making and withdraw-
ing the reference.  Because the reference to bankruptcy courts is justified
by their unique expertise in bankruptcy matters, the reference should be
withdrawn when matters outside that unique expertise are presented for
decision.281  Those non-bankruptcy matters are better handled by general-
ist district court judges who possess generalized experience and the secur-
ity of life tenure.282
3. Overcoming the Narrowing Interpretations
The distinction between successful arguments for mandatory with-
drawal and those that are unsuccessful turns primarily on movants’ ability
to demonstrate a need for “interpreting, not applying” or “material and
substantial consideration of” antitrust law.  Most unsuccessful motions rais-
ing antitrust issues appear to fail based on their oblique references to anti-
trust claims or counter-claims, without a meaningful demonstration of the
complexity of those claims.  In contrast, successful motions show the inter-
pretive challenges inherent in deciding the antitrust issue.  For example,
the assertion of a tying challenge in Lifemark Hospitals succeeded in pro-
ducing withdrawal to the district court when the movant described the
difficult issues of market definition, reasonableness of the restraint, and
the existence of a tying product.283  In contrast, the unsuccessful motion
280. See NANCY C. DREHER ET AL., BANKRUPTCY REFERENCE MANUAL § 2.11
(Norton, 5th ed. 2014) (noting most courts hold that interpretation be of non-
bankruptcy scheme).  A leading treatise advances the most extreme possible inter-
pretation of Section 157(d). Collier on Bankruptcy hews literally to the statutory text
to suggest both bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy issues must be present for
mandatory withdrawal, in keeping with the small minority of cases and commenta-
tors like Greenbaum and Meese. See COLLIER, supra note 262, at 3–55 to 3–57.  The
same treatise then advances the view, in deviation from the statutory text that in-
volvement in the non-bankruptcy law must extend beyond mere “consideration”
(the statutory term) to “substantial and material consideration.” See id. at  3–56 to
3–57 & n.19 (citing cases).  That approach cannot be justified by any statutory
interpretive methodology and can only be explained by a full-throated preference
to the narrowest possible reading of the mandatory withdrawal provision.
281. See Franklin Sav. Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 150 B.R. 976, 980
(D. Kan. 1993) (stating that minority approach would incongruously leave matters
involving only non-bankruptcy issues in bankruptcy court, while matters involving
partly bankruptcy issues would be withdrawn).
282. See Am. Freight Sys., Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n (In re Am.
Freight Sys., Inc.), 150 B.R. 790, 794 (D. Kan. 1993); Sullivan v. Hiser (In re St.
Mary Hosp.), 115 B.R. 495, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1990); United States v. Johns-Manville
Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 63 B.R. 600, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also COL-
LIER, supra note 262, at 3–62 (stating district courts are better equipped than bank-
ruptcy courts to determine non-bankruptcy federal issues).  “Possibly Congress was
wary of the possibility that a bankruptcy judge would favor the Code provision that
conflicted with a provision contained in another federal statute and wanted district
judges to have the last word on where the case would be tried.” Id.
283. See supra notes 263–64 and accompanying text.
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in Hawaiian Airlines involved antitrust counterclaims but no demonstra-
tion of what “portions of the antitrust laws” were implicated.284
A full description of the process for deciding a complex merger issue
should satisfy the need to tailor the withdrawal motion to that in Hawaiian
Airlines.  To an extent even greater than tying claims, full consideration of
a merger challenge involves market definition, calculation of market
shares and changes in market shares, consideration of the competitive ef-
fects of the business combination, consideration of possible efficiencies
that might emerge and a determination whether those efficiencies are spe-
cific to the proposed business combination, and consideration of the fail-
ing-firm defense.  The merger challenge ultimately turns on the net effect
on competition from the business combination—whether the competitive
effects are overborne by, or overbear, the asserted efficiencies and the fail-
ing-firm defense.  A well-drawn motion describing the process, including
ample reference to the Guidelines, with a preliminary demonstration that
the proposed business combination presents facial concerns for un-
resolved competitive effects, easily meets the standard.
To the extent that courts hew to the excessively narrow interpreta-
tions of Section 157(d), either (1) requiring difficult interpretations of
both the Bankruptcy Code and the antitrust laws or (2) understanding
merger review to be mere application of facts to settled law, those ap-
proaches will require change, whether by common law, court rule, or legis-
lation.  The common law approach is the most promising.  The
interpretation of Section 157(d) followed by the majority of courts should,
in the presence of well-made motions, require antitrust challenges to
bankruptcy business combinations to be decided by district courts.
C. Dismissals of Bankruptcy Petitions for Bad Faith
Bankruptcy courts have the power, on request and after holding a
hearing, to dismiss Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions “for cause” under
Bankruptcy Code Section 1112.285  “Cause” includes abuse of the bank-
ruptcy process, which has been found in cases in which a financially
healthy debtor sought bankruptcy to avoid antitrust liability.  In SGL Car-
bon Corp., the bankruptcy court concluded a desire to avoid antitrust liabil-
ity in a suit alleging that price fixing was not a “valid reorganizational
purpose” and upheld the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the Chapter 11
petition.286  Bad faith dismissals operate to screen out bankruptcy peti-
tions that are not consistent with the policies underlying bankruptcy law.
An analogous screen exists at the plan confirmation stage, where
bankruptcy courts are charged by Code Section 1129(a) to confirm only
those plans “proposed in good faith.”287  Good faith is a poorly defined
284. See supra notes 272–73 and accompanying text.
285. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (2012).
286. 200 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1999).
287. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).
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phrase “generally interpreted to mean that there exists ‘a reasonable likeli-
hood that the plan will achieve a result consistent with the objectives and
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.’”288  Good faith for purposes of confir-
mation exists where “there is a reasonable likelihood of reorganizing the
debtor” even if the plan is not the best possible approach to satisfying
creditor claims.289  A more stringent phrasing of the good faith require-
ment for plan confirmation requires “an arguable relation [ ] between the
chapter 11 plan and the reorganization-related purposes that the chapter
was designed to serve.”290
The uses of “good faith” in Sections 1112 (as a judicial gloss on
“cause”) and 1129, while fundamentally disparate as a procedural matter,
are unsurprisingly intertwined.291  Some version of a good faith require-
ment has existed in bankruptcy legislation at least since the 1898 Bank-
ruptcy Act.292  Interpretations of historical good faith requirements for
plan confirmation operated to prevent the debtor from using bankruptcy
“to accomplish an inequitous or unfair result, or to obtain a result con-
trary to the spirit of the statute . . . .”293
Existing interpretations of “cause” and “good faith” requirements in
Chapter 11 give little support to an argument that pursuing bankruptcy to
facilitate a business combination either is a bad faith basis for filing or
represents a bad faith plan proposal.  The Bankruptcy Code has not been
interpreted and applied to accommodate non-stakeholder interests or ex-
ternal regulatory concerns like antitrust law.  Common law or legislative
change would be required to accomplish this result.
Legislative change might involve one or both of two Code amend-
ments.  First, the definition of “cause” in Code Section 1112(b)(4) might
be amended to include “violation of controlling federal or state regulatory
288. In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 425 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting
In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 B.R. 367, 370 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982)) (internal quotations
omitted), superseded in statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 508, 98 Stat. 353 (1984).
289. Nite Lite Inns, 17 B.R. at 370–71.  In other words, good faith arguments
should not provide a basis for advancing one proposed plan over another.
290. Connell v. Coastal Cable T.V., Inc. (In re Coastal Cable T.V., Inc.), 709
F.2d 762, 764 (1st Cir. 1983).
291. See In re Victory Const. Co., 9 B.R. 549, 551 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981) (“As
the cases disclose, however, judicial analysis of the meaning, scope, and dimension
of ‘good faith’ in rehabilitation or reorganization cases has not differentiated be-
tween the ‘good faith’ required to confirm a plan of arrangement, and the ‘good
faith’ required at the outset as a condition of the right to file and maintain the
proceeding.”), order vacated, 37 B.R. 222 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984).
292. See id. at 551–56 (tracing history of good faith requirements in bank-
ruptcy legislation).
293. See id. at 555–56 (interpreting Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Section 12) (foot-
note omitted).  The court discussed other interpretations that spoke to concerns
for hiding or wasting estate assets. Id.
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requirements.”294  Second, the good faith requirement for confirmation
in Section 1129(a)(3) might be amended to include “or in violation of
controlling federal or state regulatory requirements.”295  The first is the
most promising change to achieve the goals of ensuring the bankruptcy
process is not abused to achieve business combinations that the antitrust
laws would forbid.  Plan sales present substantially lesser concerns for un-
dermining the antitrust merger review process.296  Section 1112 is the ap-
propriate section to control abusive business combinations under Section
363(b).
Amending Section 1112 to mitigate the use of bankruptcy filings
solely to achieve anticompetitive business combinations is both an under-
inclusive and an overinclusive remedy.  “Cause” would still only be found if
the business combination was planned in advance of the filing and the
filing was made solely to facilitate the combination in violation of the Clay-
ton Act.297  Business combinations that violate the Clayton Act that are
planned after the petition was filed (or even planned in advance but do
not represent the cause for the filing) should not create cause for dis-
missing the petition.  The amendment would be over inclusive because it
threatens a cottage industry built on motions claiming cause for a viola-
tion of myriad federal or state regulatory schemes.  Bankruptcy courts
would necessarily become adept at processing such arguments quickly,
risking the ultimate effect that any such motion is functionally ignored.
D. Agency Review of Less-Anticompetitive Alternatives
A different approach to accomplishing the goal of stronger antitrust
review in bankruptcy is to amend the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act to provide an
entirely new structure for agency investigation of bankruptcy business
combinations.  Under this proposed approach, the antitrust enforcement
agencies would be given opportunity to investigate for up to thirty days
after a bankruptcy-court ordered business combination to proceed in dis-
trict court seeking injunctive relief.  The injunction would be granted if
the enforcement agency could demonstrate a less anticompetitive option
for disposing of the assets that is not unreasonably unfair to the constitu-
ents of the bankruptcy estate.
Under this approach, the Department of Justice would have suc-
ceeded in preliminarily blocking the SunGard/Comdisco business combi-
nation, because would-be new entrant Hewlett Packard was willing and
294. Such an amendment would be consistent with the exception to the auto-
matic stay for “enforce[ment of a] governmental unit’s . . . police and regulatory
power.”  11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
295. See id. § 1129(a)(3).  This addition might fairly be considered redundant
to the existing language “not by any means forbidden by law,” although the ex-
isting language has not been held to encompass concerns for external regulation.
296. See supra notes 249–56 and accompanying text.
297. Examples include American Airlines/TWA and SunGard/Comdisco.
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able to purchase the Comdisco assets.298  Likewise, the presence of alter-
nate bidder Westinghouse in the Financial News Network asset sale would
allow the FTC to achieve an injunction against the approved transaction
on the basis of a less competitive alternative.
The effect of such a thirty-day post-sale-order agency review would be
to create a shadow over bankruptcy business combinations that creates in-
centives for parties to the business combinations, as well as bankruptcy
courts, to avoid anticompetitive business combinations.  The effect would
be similar to the current process of feasibility testing prior to plan confir-
mation: bankruptcy courts would gain little from approving a Section
363(b) sale if the danger existed of a short-term injunction against the
sale.  Another effect of such an amendment would be to reduce the incen-
tives to file bankruptcy in order to facilitate a business combination that is
threatened with antitrust challenge.
VI. CONCLUSION
Business combinations present antitrust concerns under the Clayton
Act if the transaction would “tend to create a monopoly.”  In the ordinary
course such merger review proceeds according to well-defined and well-
understood procedural rules and substantive standards, whether in district
court or in the FTC administrative process.  Generalist federal judges and
the FTC can be assumed to be competent to enforce the Clayton Act with
an appreciation of the competitive dynamics that underlie federal merger
policy.  Ordinary course merger review recognizes the competitive realities
failing firms and declining industries present.  In the common circum-
stance of business combinations’ occurring in bankruptcy, those well-de-
fined procedures and substantive standards can be subordinated to a host
of bankruptcy-specific rules and policies.
Commentators have noted that business combinations are so com-
mon as to have become a driving purpose for business bankruptcies.  The
Bankruptcy Code contains a parallel scheme for conducting business com-
binations after the bankruptcy filing.  Two primary mechanisms operate to
allow bankruptcy court review and approval of asset sales that meet the
requirements of bankruptcy law.  First and most common is the out-of-the-
ordinary-course-of-business sale of assets under Code Section 363(b).  Sec-
ond is the more procedurally involved sale of assets conducted as part of
the plan of reorganization under Chapter 11.
This Article demonstrates that identical competitive issues arise in the
ordinary course and when the selling firm is in bankruptcy.  But bank-
ruptcy presents unique procedural challenges and countervailing substan-
tive considerations.  Procedures for review of asset sales in bankruptcy
limit the opportunities for the antitrust enforcement agencies to conduct
a careful analysis of the competitive consequences of the transaction.
298. See supra notes 235–37 and accompanying text.
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Bankruptcy courts may aim to maximize the value of the estate and to
protect the interests of stake-holders.  Those aims are in tension with anti-
trust goals of economic efficiency in service of consumer interests.
Those differences alter the antitrust analysis when merger review is
conducted in the context of bankruptcy.  The conflict creates a likelihood
that anticompetitive mergers arising in the course of bankruptcy proceed-
ings either (1) go unchallenged or (2) survive over challenges that might
have been successful outside of the bankruptcy context.  The conflict be-
tween bankruptcy and antitrust will necessarily bring about under enforce-
ment of the antitrust anti-merger prohibition relative to the optimum.
This Article addresses the optimal resolution of the conflict.  Both
bankruptcy and antitrust pursue end goals of protecting constituents who
lack the bargaining power to protect themselves through contracting.  The
conflict is fundamentally a conflict between diffuse stakeholders in the
bankrupt firm and diffuse consumers of the bankrupt firm’s output.
Tensions, where they arise, should be resolved in favor of consumers
for three reasons.  First, creditors have the ex ante ability to bargain for
protection in a way that consumers do not.  Second, merger policy outside
of bankruptcy is a mature scheme that has developed through common
law and legislative change since 1890; has been reduced to well under-
stood principles in case-law, agency decisions, and enforcement guide-
lines; and, as enforced for the past several decades, is a minimalist scheme
that favors allowing mergers to proceed if the merger promises efficien-
cies.  Third, merger policy outside of bankruptcy incorporates efficiency
considerations related to failing companies under the failing-firm defense,
protecting the policies of bankruptcy to the extent they are not inconsis-
tent with antitrust goals.
Reform is appropriate to resolve this conflict and to move the level of
antitrust review of bankruptcy asset sales toward the optimum.  This Arti-
cle closes by proposing several reform possibilities, a combination of
which may be required to bring about the optimal balance between the
goals of bankruptcy and those of antitrust.
64
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss5/1
